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PREFACE
When in 1927 Dr. E.L. Bogart, the economic histo-
rian, declared that he considered that Louisiana
furnished the "richest field of unexplored research
1
in banking evolution of any state in America," he ex-
pressed a need that has been felt by students of bank-
ing for many years. Though Louisiana has been a pio-
neer in the development of sound banking in this coun-
try, having passed even as early as 1842 a law that Hor
ace White has described as "eminently scientific" and
"in nearly all respects a model for other states and
2
countries," no adequate single treatment of the develop
ment of banking in Louisiana has ever been written.
When and why were banks first chartered in Louisiana?
What part did the State play in the development of Lou-
isiana's banking system? How did the banks affect the
development of the Mississippi Valley, and how were
they themselves in turn affected by this development?
What were the results of the Civil War upon the banks
in Louisiana? To what extent have the banking laws of
Louisiana been copied by other states and by the United
1
Personal communication.
2
White, Horace: "National and State Banks," Annals
of the American Academy. March, 1893, p. 9.
iii
IV
States? These are some of the problems considered in
this study.
It should not be forgotten, though, that Louisiana's
bainking system did not develop wholly of itself. Remark
ably original as it has been, nevertheless, at nearly
every stage of its development, it has reflected the evo-
lution taking place throughout the country. Completely
to understand its history, therefore, one should have
well in mind the facts in the development of baulking in
other states amd in the Union. Only the most important
facts cam be given in the short space of a chapter, but
it is hoped that the outline in Chapter I will suffice
to provide an adequate background for this study.
I am indebted to Dr. E.T. Miller and the other mem-
bers of the Department of Economics of the University of
Texas for suggestions and criticisms.
Stephen A, Caldwell
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
11. FINANCIAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA BEFORE 1818 22
111. NEW ORLEANS FROM 1821 TO 1860 34
IV. WILD BANKING 1818-1837 46
V. BANKING TROUBLES 1837-1860 64
VI. THE BANK ACT OF 1842 81
VII. THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 103
VIII. THE STATE DEBT AND REPUDIATION 117
IX. 1882-1930 128
APPENDICES 147
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of banking in the United States can be
conveniently if arbitrarily divided into five
periods. The first of these periods began “with the
conception of the Colman Bank, which never really got
farther than that," in 1715. The seoond period began
in 1781 with the establishment of the Bank of North
America; the third, with the passage by the New York
Legislature, in 1838, of a bill requiring the securing
of bank notes by the deposit of stock; and the fourth,
in 1863 with the establishment of the national banking
1
system. This division into periods, made, in 1893, on
the basis of the revolutionary changes in the banking
system, would if made today require the addition of a
fifth period that beginning with the establishment
of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.
During the first period, that ending in 1781, the
year in which Pennsylvania chartered the Bank of North
America, there were no institutions that performed the
services now considered the proper functions of a bank,
1
Harter, M.D. : “American Banking,” American Acad-
emy of Political Science, Vol. 111, March, 1893, pp.
559-564.
1
2though several companies were organized for the purpose
2
of issuing notes. All the colonies, with the exception
of Virginia, issued paper money, which varied in value
according to the credit of the colonies and the quantity
of the money in circulation. In 1776 the colonial gov-
ernment began to issue paper money, which "on 31st of
May, 1781, ceased to circulate as money, but .... after-
wards was bought on speculation from 400 to 1 up to
3
1000 to 1."
The second period in American banking began in 1781
with the establishment in Philadelphia of the Bank of
North America, the first bank in the United States. The
Bank of Massachusetts and the Bank of New York were es-
tablished in 1784, and the Bank of Maryland, in 1790.
The capital stocks of all of these banks, which totaled
$4,850,000, were paid in specie; and all the banks re-
ceived deposits and made loans. Perhaps their most im-
portant function was that of stabilizing the currency
through their issues of redeemable notes.
In 1791 the First Bank of the United States was
chartered. This bank was organized to provide suffi-
cient quantities of sound currency and to assist in
financing the government. Nine branches of this bank
2
Gouge, Wm. M.: ”A Short History of Paper Money and
Banking,” Journal of Banking, pp. 207-224.
3
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3were later established in different parts of the coun-
try. Capitalized at $10,000,000, of which $2,000,000
was subscribed by the government, the bank was permit-
ted to open for business when the sum of $400,000 had
been paid in.
One-fourth of all subscriptions, private and
corporate, was to be paid in specie, and three-
fourths in United States stock bearing 6 per cent
interest, payable in four equal semi-annual pay-
ments.^
Daring the twenty years that followed the estab-
lishment of the First Bank of the United States, the
growth in population of the country, the addition of
new territories, the stabilization of the currency,
and the greater need for credit facilities consequent
upon the growth in business and commerce — all caused
an increase in the number of banks from 4 to 100, and
in the banking capitalizations from $4,850,000 to about
5
$48,000,000. In all these banks the proportion of note
issues to capital stock varied, but in general it can
be said that the ratio was from two to three times the
amount of paid-in capital.
The end of the 18th century was characterized
in this country by bitter political controversy. A
bit of the leaven of the French Revolution was at
work on this side of the Atlantic. The old order
was giving place to the new and more democratic re-
4
Holdsworth, J.T.:
HThe First Bank of the United
States,” National Monetary Commission, Vol. IV, p. 19.
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House Document No. 3704, Vol. 76, pp. 207-240.
4gime .... and the banks then in existence could not
avoid becoming involved to some extent in the con-
troversy .... All through the first decade of the
19th century politics played a big part in the de-
velopment of banking. The political upheaval of
1800 put the Republicans in control of most legis-
latures, and they proceeded forthwith to retaliate
against the Federalists, who, while in power, had
sought to maintain a monopoly of banking privileges
The Republicans in Congress also showed their
hostility to the First Bank of the United States,
which they regarded as a Federalist institution.
In 1811, when the Bank's charter expired, the ef-
fort to obtain its renewal became a political is-
sue .... and when the message (a bill providing
for the renewal of the Bank's oharter) came up
for passage in the House of Representatives, it
was defeated by a single vote, and in the Senate
it was lost by a tie.
During the twenty years of its existence the
Bank of the United States had exerted a strong in-
fluence in behalf of sound currency. It had re-
fused to receive the notes of state banks which
did not readily redeem their issues with specie,
and this was probably the main reason why they
had united in opposition to a renewal of its char-
ter. It had also acted as fiscal agent of the
government, transferring its funds without charge,
carrying most of its deposits, and making loans
to the Treasury whenever these were needed. 6
During the four years following the expiration of
the charter of the First Bank of the United States and
the establishment in 1816 of the Second Bank of the
United States, the number of banks jumped to 208, and
the capital more than doubled. This growth in the num-
ber of banks and in the amount of bank capitalization
was accompanied by an equally impressive growth in the
6
Scroggs, Wm.O.: A Century of Banking Pro.grss.Sr pp. 14'IS.
5general prosperity of the people, who with typical
boom-time exuberance and short-sightedness attributed
the growth in their fortunes mainly to the banks.
H The desire of accumulating wealth without the
dull exercise of labor engendered a spirit of spec-
ulation. It was supposed that the mere establish-
ment of banks would of itself create capital, that
a bare promise to pay money was money itself, and
that a nominal rise in the prices of land and com-
modities ever attendant upon a plenty of money was
a real increase of substantual wealth .... Under
these delusive impressions associations of individ-
uals sprang up in every quarter holding inducements
to the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, and
the mechanic to abandon the dull pursuits of a la-
borious life for the golden dreams of an artificial
fortune.?
This boom-time hysteria over what was thought to be
a veritable bonanza was not, however, so general as to
blind the eyes of wiser men to the prime financial ex-
igencies of the time to wit, resumption of specie
payment and the stabilization of the currency. And
though by 1816 it was generally recognized that resump-
tion was the single condition of currency stabilization,
the government, with the existing means at its disposal,
could in effect do nothing. To require resumption of
the banks meant either that the government would visit
the sins of the banks upon their innocent creditors, or
that the government itself would have to repair the
7
Raguet, Condy: Currency and Banking, pp. 296-298.
68
losses to the creditors. Either was unacceptable, and
to solve the problem the government in 1816 chartered
the Second Bank of the United States.
This Second Bank of the United States began opera-
tions in January, 1817. Its charter was to run for
twenty years, and for its franchise the Bank paid to
the government the sum of $1,500,000. Of the $35,000,
000 capital the government subscribed $7,000,000. The
Bank was forbidden to obligate itself to any amount ex-
ceeding its capital, and five of the twenty-five direc-
tors were to be appointed by the President of the United
9
States.
In the first eighteen months of its existence the
Bank attempted to stabilize the currency by substitut-
ing for the numberless unstandardized state bank notes
notes of its own issue. It estimated that $20,000,000
of the notes would be needed, but it was unable to issue
more them $10,000,000, simply because of the physical
inability of the president and vice-president to sign
a larger number of notes. However, as later events
proved, the result would have been the same even if the
Bank had succeeded in circulating a larger number of
8
Dewey, Davis R.: “The Second Bank of the United
States," National Monetary Commission, Vol. IV, p, 152.
9
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7notes. For, during the whole time that the Bank was
making the issues, the notes were falling in value.
This decline in the value of the notes was caused by
the great exportation of specie from the country; and
the Bank was unable, with its comparatively slight re-
sources, to stop the fall. In the face of the with-
drawal of some $12,000,000 in specie from the country,
the Bank was comparatively helpless; and its own pur-
chases from foreign countries of upwards of seven mil-
lions in specie did no more than defer the inevitable
10
crash, which came in July, 1818.
In that year the people were treated to the familiar
spectacle of banks attempting to protect themselves in
time of panic. All the banks, including the Second Bank
of the United States, followed the usual course of banks
at such a time; and the people suffered the usual evil
consequences. By 1824 recovery had set in and Nicholas
Biddle had been made president of the Bank to replace
Cheves, who had been acting president since 1818. Under
Biddle’s administration the Bank had fair sailing until
1829, the year Jackson delivered his first blow at the
Bank. In 1832 the proponents of the Bank presented to
Congress a bill providing for a recharter. The old char-
10
Gouge, Wm. M. : Op.. cit. , p. 288.
8ter did not expire until 1836; but the friends of the
Bank, believing that Jackson would not dare to refuse
a charter on the eve of his campaign for re-election,
’’determined to stake its existence on a turn of poli-
tics .... The measure passed. Jackson accepted the
11
challenge and vetoed the bill.”
Jackson was re-elected. He naturally felt that his
election was a mandate from the people to destroy the
Bank; and one of the first official acts of his second
term was that of transferring the government funds on
deposit at the Second Bank to banks operated by his sup-
porters. In retaliation for this blow the Bank institut
ed a retrenchment policy with a view to showing the
people the error of their way in sanctioning Jackson’s
refusal to recharter the Bank. This action of the Bank
had, however, the very opposite of the effect desired
and succeeded only in alienating many of its friends.
Declaring that 1,1 Andrew Jackson would never rechar-
ter that monster of corruption; that sooner than live
in a country where such a power prevailed he would seek
an asylum in the wilds of Arabia," 1 the President in
11
Ibid.
12
Quoted by Scroggs, Wm. 0.: Ojg.. cit. . p. 67
91836 allowed the charter of the Bank to expire. The
Second Bank of the United States was rechartered as
a state bank by the State of Pennsylvania. Renamed
the "Bank of the United States,” it continued to oper-
ate until 1841, when it was forced to liquidate.
The latter part of this second period in the bank-
ing history of the country saw revolutionary innovations
in the states' methods of regulating the banks. New
York is to be credited with leading the advance. Its
passage of the Banking Law of 1838, the most important
piece of banking legislation in the history of the coun-
try up to this time, marked the end of a series of laws
that had revolutionized the banking system of the state.
This Law of 1838, which is generally held to have
initiated the third period in the banking history of
the United States, was preceded by three other acts:
the Law of 1824, restricting banking privileges to in-
stitutions operating as banks and nothing else; the
Law of 1827, setting up a code of general regulations
for the banks to replace the old system of imposing sep-
arate regulations for every bank; and the Law of 1829,
13
providing for the establishment of a safety fund.
These three acts did much to reform the banking sys-
13
Ibid., pp. 31-36.
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tern in New York; but two of the most objectionable
features of the system, the lack of security offered
by banks to holders of their notes and the manner of
granting bank charters, they left untouched. Bank
charters were granted by the legislature, and secur-
ing a bank charter was purely a matter of playing pol-
itics. To the w ins M bank charters were juicy plums to
be awarded only to henchmen, and to the "outs" they
were more unattainable than spiritual salvation. Cor-
ruption and log-rolling characterized the whole system.
Such a system was regarded as conducive to mon-
opoly, and the "locofoco,” or hard money, faction of
the Democrats for some years had made an issue of
it and had pledged themselves to break it up. 14
In 1838 the Democrats by allying themselves with the
Whigs succeeded in passing a law dealing with these two
abuses.
By the Law of 1838
H
....
the comptroller was author-
ized to issue circulating notes to any association or-
ganizing itself as a bank and depositing stocks of the
United States or of any state, or bonds secured by
15
mortgages on real estate of a certain specific grade. 11
The bill also provided for a free banking system; that
is, one that permits any group of men of good rep-
14
Ibid.
,
d. 130.
15
White, Horace: Ojd. cit.. p. 540.
11
utation and possessing a moderate amount of capital, to
16
establish a bank. After the enactment of this free
banking law, people could secure a charter from state
authorities at any time by meeting the requirements of
the general law.
Seventeen states followed New York in adopting free
banking, and several other states also imitated New
York's scheme of protecting note issues. In passing
their free banking laws, most of the states, however,
failed to include the note security provision; and
as a result the country was flooded with "wild cat"
and "red dog" notes.
In 1842 Louisiana made the second advance contribut-
ed by this period to the banking progress of the coun-
try. The Law of 1842 permitted the banks of Louisiana
to issue notes secured by 33 1/3 per cent in specie
and 66 2/3 per cent in paper running no longer than 90
days. Unlike New York, Louisiana operated on the prin-
ciple not of creating the demand, but of supplying the
demand. And unlike New York, which, in putting the note
issuing power in the hands of the comptroller and re-
quiring as security for the notes state or federal
bonds, or good mortgages, had followed the
H
currency
16
Scroggs, Wm.O.: Od. cit., p. 139.
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principle," Louisiana used the French "banking princi-
ple." The Louisiana Banking Law of 1842 also provided
for the protection of depositors. Depositors were
given the same security as that accorded to note hold-
ers. This principle of protecting the depositors was
later copied by every state in the Union and by the
national government.
Though by 1860 many of the defects in the state
banking systems had been remedied, the currency sys-
tem was still unsatisfactory.
Of the 1600 banks in the country only a few
issued notes that had more than local accepta-
bility. In the West the situation was still
chaotic. There was such a motley array of bank
notes that every merchant had need of expert
advice to enable him to know what moneys to re-
ceive and which to reject. In the larger cities
“bank-note detectors" were regularly published to
assist every one who handled considerable sums of
money in distinguishing good notes from bad.
1-7
Counterfeit and altered notes flooded the country;
and there were even more notes of banks that did not
exist and of banks that had suspended payment.
The lack of any centralized control over note
issues led to wide fluctuations in the quantity
as well as the quality of the circulation. In
times of prosperity the banks were easily tempt-
ed to undue expansion, thereby stimulating an un-
healthy boom. Then, when reaction came, the
sharp contraction resorted to by the banks tended
to accentuate the depression. Thus a note circu-
lation of |215,000,000 in 1857 was reduced to
17
Ibid., p. 160.
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$155,000,000 in 1858.
The fourth period in the history of banking in
this country begins with the government’s attempts
to eliminate these abuses and to stimulate the demand
for government securities by enacting the National
Banking Act of 1863. The Act was revised and re-enact
ed in 1864.
In this shape it differed in a number of par-
ticulars from what it now is, after many subsequent
amendments. The minimum capital was #50,000 in
places of less than 6,000 inhabitants, with an as-
cending scale for larger cities. This was later
reduced to #25,000 for places of 3,000 inhabi-
tants or less. Each bank at first was required to
deposit United States bonds bearing not less than
5 per cent interest, to an amount of a third of
its capital, and in no case less than $30,000, as
security for its circulation. The bank then might
issue notes up to 90 per cent of the value of the
bonds, but the total issues might not exceed its
capital. 19
In 1865 this Act was supplemented by a law levying
the prohibitive tax of 10 per cent upon all state bank
notes. State banks fiercely opposed this measure, for
its passage meant the stoppage of the immense flow of
wealth that was accruing to them through their issues
of inflated currency; but after the enactment of the
law, there were few which did not hasten to join the
18
Ibid., p. 164.
19
Ibid., p. 199.
14
national banking system.
The national banking system did not create the
market for government securities that it had been ex-
pected to, but it did standardize the currency.
Within eight months of the passage of the act tax-
ing state bank notes, 731 state banks joined the nation-
al banking system. By 1867 the banks had circulated
#300,000,000 of notes, the maximum fixed by the National
Banking Act; and in 1870 the demand for notes had be-
come so great that the government, to relieve the scarc-
ity of the circulating medium occasioned by the with-
drawal from circulation of state bank notes, raised the
maximum to #354,000,000. By 1873, #341,000,000 were in
circulation, and the maximum would have been issued had
20
it not been for the distribution regulation.
From 1873 to 1890 the amount of notes in circulation
actually decreased more than #200,000,000. In 1875 the
government, with the intent to increase the amount of
notes in circulation, passed a law abolishing the max-
imum on note issues and the distribution and apportion-
ment regulations, and providing for the annual redemp-
20
Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indian-
apolis Convention, 1898, p. 206.
15
tion of greenbacks to the amount of 80 per cent of the
annual increase in the amount of national bank notes.
However, instead of increasing, the currency decreased.
This decrease was two-fold. There was, first, the de-
crease occasioned by the rise in price of government
bonds; and there was, second, the decrease caused by
the withdrawal from circulation of the greenbacks.
From 1875 to 1878, $43,000,000 in new national bank
notes were issued. In accordance with the terms of
The Act of 1875 11 .... an amount of legal tenders
equal to 80 per cent of the $43,000,000 of new na-
-21
tional bank notes or $36,400,000 had been withdrawn."
At the same time the banks withdrew $74,000,000 of old
notes. The net result was that a total of $67,400,000
of the currency was withdrawn. In 1878 the government
ceased the retiring of greenbacks.
In the years that followed the enactment of the
Act of 1875, up to the end of the fourth period, the
government continued to legislate upon the currency;
but its work was little more than an elaboration of the
principles laid down in the acts of 1863,
1 65, and '75.
The prime motive in framing these laws had been to es-
21
Ibid., p. 208.
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tablish a sound currency. In this object, they both
succeeded and failed. For, though standardized, the
currency was rigid. One exasperated contemporary of
the system described it as being “stiff as a ram‘s
horn and almost as crooked.“ Increasing the amount of
currency was a virtual impossibility, for any increase
in the amount of notes in circulation meant a corres-
ponding increase in the price of bonds, which in turn
meant a loss to the banks. Not unnaturally the banks
resisted any attempt to increase note issues, and
this in the face of the greatest demand for a medium
of exchange in the history of the country.
A new era had begun in America, an era of growth
and expansion. Always an agricultural country, the
United States was in the process of becoming the most
industrialized nation in the world. Agriculture was
being revolutionized, railroads were checkerboarding
the country, and towns were springing up like mush-
rooms.
The demand for a medium of exchange at such a time
was of course very great. The amount of legal money
was insufficient to meet this demand, and it was to
supply it that hanking credit, the “banking riddle,“
17
received its greatest development. Though from 1867
to 1898 the amount of currency increased from $709,
000,000 to $1,210,000,000, an increase of less than
40 per cent, loans and discounts increased more than
300 per cent. And in 1899 John Jay Knox estimated that
between 90 and 92 per cent of the business of the
country was carried on by means of checks or other
22
means of credit.
Daring this period, too, began the concentration
of funds in the large city banks. The law permitted
banks to keep three-fifths of their reserves on deposit
in reserve city banks. The purpose of this provision
was to enable small banks to have a clearing house for
checks drawn upon each other. But in time certain city
banks started the practice of paying a small rate of
interest on such deposits.
In 1911 much less than one-half (246.3 millions)
the total reserves (551.7 millions) was in the ac-
tual possession of the country banks.
Funds in addition to reserves were also deposited by the
small banks during dull times to get interest, small
though it was. Moreover, state banks deposited their
22
Knox, John Jay: A History of Banking in the
United States, p. 205.
—
~23
Laughlin, J.L.: Banking Reform, p. 200,
18
reserves in the large city banks; and, since the re-
serve required of state banks was generally smaller
than that of national banks, it is probable that state
banks sent in even larger amounts than did the nation-
al ones.
It was necessary for city banks to find employ-
ment for sums thus deposited with them by other
banks. This could only be done during the dull
season when the country deposits were at their
height, by stimulating borrowers through the of-
fer of unusually low interest. And, inasmuch as
the deposits were always subject to demand, they
could similarly be loaned only on call, it being
seldom that large sums of money could be used in
legitimate business operations subject to call.
The outcome of the practice was the stimulation
of loans to the stock market and of speculative
dealings of all sorts. 2^
In 1911 the amount of deposits from small banks in
large city banks was in excess of $1,500,000,000, of
85
which $432,000,000 were in New York alone.
In addition to the concentration of funds, there
was a centralization of power in the big banks. The
commonest means of obtaining this power was the re-
discount system. Other means were the holding com-
panies, organized under state laws; consolidations,
to increase capital; and chain banking all of
which practices were a serious menace to the financial
security of the country.
24
Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indian-
aoolis Convent ion, 1898, p. 213.
25
Laughlin, J.L.: ojd. cit. ,p. 201.
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However, in spite of repeated warnings by econom-
ists, people did not appreciate the gravity of the situ
at ion until the panic of 1907. This depression, though
brief, was severe enough to awaken even Congress; and
that body set up a National Monetary Commission to
study and report on the various banking systems of the
world. The findings of this Commission were used as a
basis for the organization of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem in 1913, the year in which the fifth period of
American banking may be said to begin.
To solve the problem of the congestion of funds,
twelve regional hanks were set up. Elasticity of the
currency was secured hy the Federal Reserve System
through its issue of federal reserve notes hacked hy
gold and commercial paper. And to assure a central-
ized control of credit, the Federal Reserve Board was
given the power arbitrarily to set the rediscount rate
and engage in open market operations.
This hill was not designed to destroy the national
hanks nor to force control over the state hanks. And,
though the national hanks were required to take stock
in the system to the amount of 6 per cent of their cap'
ital, they were compensated hy a reduction in the re-
serve requirements and a rediscount market free from
obligations. State banks might, as they pleased, join
the system or remain out of it; and the requirements
made of the state banks that joined the system were
the same as those imposed upon national banks.
Later even more generous concessions were made to
the state banks to induce them to join the system. One
of the earliest objections of the state banks was that
most of their paper was ineligible to meet the require-
ments of the Federal Reserve System; this objection
was quieted when the Board volunteered its services to
assist the banks in making the minor changes in their
paper necessary to make it eligible for rediscount. In
1917 the original Act was amended to make it possible
for state banks to withdraw from the system after giv-
26
ing a six months written notice. And in 1927 the Mc-
Fadden Act provided that member banks could invest
"savings deposits on city mortgages for as long as five
27
years."
These concessive laws had relatively little effect,
though; for by 1931 there were only 982 state bank
28
members. Considering the faot that in 1931 there were
26
Reed, Harold L. : The Federal Reserve Policy, p. 66.
27
Preston, H.H.: "The McFadden Act," American Eco-
nomic Review, June, 1927, pp. 201-218.
28
National Industrial Conference Board: The Banking
Situation in the United States, p. 67.
20
15,987 state banks, it is evident that a large pro-
portion of the banking of the country was beyond the
control of the Federal Reserve System.
The next important national banking legislation
came in 1931 with the passage of the Glass-Steagall
Bill. This bill provided for the freeing of the gold
by lowering the standards of eligible paper; and it
permitted national banks to issue additional bank
notes by making 3 billions of government bonds eligi-
39
ble as reserves against note issues.
29
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug., 1931, p. 478.
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CHAPTER II
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA BEFORE 1818
The banking history of Louisiana begins in 1804
with the establishment of the Louisiana Bank a few
months after the Louisiana Purchase. The financial
history of Louisiana, however, goes back to the very
beginnings of the territory. The story of Louisiana's
struggles with the money problem is a fascinating one,
but the limits of the present treatise do not admit of
its being told here. Here it is sufficient briefly to
mention some of the expedients employed by the colonists
in dealing with the money situation, and to say that
".... Louisiana, during its colonial days, seems to
have served as somewhat of a laboratory in which a num-
ber of theories and systems of money and exchange were
1
experimented with."
What were these theories and systems? To discover
this, it is necessary to go back a century before the
establishment of the Louisiana Bank, to go back, indeed,
to the days when barter was the commonest and, in many
cases, the only form of exchange. Up until 1703 barter
was practically the only form of exchange, if we except
1
Chambers, H.E.: History of Louisiana, Vol. I, p. 161.
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“semi-ba.rter“ ( by which is meant a system in which com-
modities are a standard of value; as, for example,
bears' oil, tobacco, and corn ).
“Bills of credit,“ first issued by the colonial
governor Iberville, were the first paper currency in
Louisiana. These bills of credit were very similar to
our modern checks. They were issued until 1722, though
their purchasing power had declined long before they
were called in, to be redeemed with copper coins. When
they were called in, it was on such short notice that
many people in outlying districts were not advised of
the date in time to get their money. The supply of
copper in the colonial treasury was not sufficient to
redeem all the bills of credit; r and after the copper
supply was exhausted, the treasury issued new notes to
redeem the old bills of credit.
Another kind of currency was issued by the home
government on March 9, 1717 and sent to New France and
Louisiana. In 1719, 25,000,000 livres in numbered bank
notes bearing the corporate seal were issued in New
France and Louisiana by the Company of the Indies.
In order that such notes should he paid to no
one hut himself, the holder, on receipt, was to
sign them, and in case of loss immediately to noti-
fy the Company. If not recovered by the end of
five years, the Company (sic) pledged itself to
, p. 156.
24
pay to the holder the full value.
On October 27, 1727 the colonial officials informed
the home government that 26,800 livres in treasury
notes (billets de caisse) had been put into circula-
tion by the ordinateur .... The shortage in bills of
exchange and copper money made it necessary for the
agents, in order to meet the obligations of the Com-
pany, to put into circulation 50,000 livres in trea-
sury notes for each of the years 1728 and 1729 ....
From 1729-31 the Company sent merchandise to the
colony and managed through its sale to retire a great
many of the notes at a reduction of 50 per cent on
the face value. 3
In 1731 the Company liquidated.
Though some silver was used as currency even before
Iberville's bills of exchange, the quantity and circu-
4
lation were very small. Louisiana had no silver mines,
and for her supply of that metal was forced to depend
upon importations from other countries. The natural re-
sult was, of course, that silver was hoarded and exported
and the less valuable currency was used as the exchange
medium.
The rapidity with which it disappeared upon ax-
riving was at times surprising. It seemed to go back
to France quicker than it came, the recipients pre-
ferring to purchase from the mother country rather
than from the colonial commissary as giving them a
wider choice. 5
By 1718 the colony's demands for more specie had be-
come so pressing that a copper coinage was struck "for
3
Surrey, N.M.Miller: The Commerce of Louisiana
during the French Regime, p. 117.
4
Chambers, H.E. : Op. cit. , p. 158.
5
Ibid.
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the use of the King‘s colonies in America, and ordered
to be used in the payment of troops. It was declared a
6
lawful tender in the company stores." Copper coins were
no more satisfactory a currency, though, than other
forms of money which had no acceptability in the mother
country. "Copper coins are so depreciated here that no
one wants them," said one contemporary of the system. In
1726 copper was made legal tender in France, and it was
not long after this that copper coin began to leave the
colony just as silver had before. "Very little copper
remained in the colony, because the crews of the vessels
8
carried it away."
In 1732, when the King of France put Louisiana upon a
specie basis, practically all of the small amount of coin
still remaining in the colony vanished. Before the end
of the year coin had become so scarce that the governor
and the ordinateur were forced to issue bills of exchange
to move the tobacco crop; and the King issued card money
9
which became known as the "King’s money." During the
'30’s the currency was greatly inflated, principally in
6
Martin, F.X.: History of Louisiana, p. 148.
7
“Minutes of the Superior Council of Louisiana,“ quoted
in Mississippi Provincial Archives. Vol. 11, p. 307.
8
Ibid., p. 501.
9
Surrey, N.M. Miller: oj3> cit.. p. 124.
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order to supply the military; and by 1739 it was prac-
tically valueless.
From 1739 to 1763 the currency situation was unsatis-
factory. Paper money continued to be used every new
issue being used to redeem the former. And the system
was made even more intolerable by counterfeiting, dis-
-10
honest ordinateurs, and agiotage, which developed to
the point almost of professionalism.
By 1763, the date of Spain’s acquisition of Louisiana,
7,000,000 livres of the French paper currency were in
circulation. Spain accepted France’s valuation on the
money of one-fourth the nominal value and redeemed it
with ’’libranzas.” The currency situation was consider-
ably improved by the importation of silver, which Span-
ish trade made possible.
The period of Spanish rule in Louisiana was a prosper-
ous one for the port of New Orleans. With the increase in
the population of Louisiana and the development that the
eastern part of the Mississippi Valley was undergoing in
the hands of the Union, trade and commerce through the
port increased greatly. In 1798 the commerce was almost
doubled by the improvements made in river navigation, and
by the time Louisiana was ceded to the United States, the
annual commerce tnrough the port of New Orleans was valued
10
The baying and selling of money.
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at more than $4,000,000.
On October 1, 1800, Spain retroceded Louisiana to
France. April 30, 1803, France sold Louisiana to the
United States. December 20, 1803, W. 0.0. Claiborne
took over the governorship of the territory on behalf
of the United States. Governor Claiborne found a very
disordered and discontented population. The population
of New Orleans and its vicinity was, in the main, com-
posed of three nationalities, immigrants from the United
States, Spanish, and French; and all of them were hos-
tile to one another. The Spanish were perhaps the most
irreconcilable. To the peoples’ natural grievance at
seeing another country supplant their own in the con-
trol of the colony were added the complaints of the
priests at seeing their life's work undone by the ter-
ritory's passing into Protestant hands. And the mili-
tary bewailed the loss of its power and prestige. All
the Spanish elements were goaded by officials of the
home government to end their troubles by setting up
12
an independent "Western Empire."
The French were only slightly less insubordinate than
the Spanish. For forty years they had chafed under Span-
11
"Internal Commerce of the United States," Report of
the United States Treasury Department, 1888, p, 185,
‘
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ish arrogance; and then, only twenty days after being
told that they were rid of the Spanish scourge, they
were afflicted with a new rule as repugnant as the form-
er. Of the discontent of the French, Laussat, the colo-
nial prefect, said:
Louisianans have seen themselves, with much re-
gret , rejected for the second time from the bosom
of their mother country .... But hardly had the
agents of that government taken the reins, when they
accumulated errors on errors and blunders on blun-
ders
.... If our government should ever look back
to this country, it should be, in my opinion, with
a view of entirely detaching the western states
from the rest of the confederacy. Such a scheme,
far from being extravagant, would have, on the
contrary, innumerable chances of success. Time alone
will one day bring on this scission.
13
It is easy to dismiss this dictum of Laussat‘s as
merely the personal spleen of a thwarted man, but it
would be a mistake to do so. There had been w errors"
and "blunders" on the part of the United States Govern-
ment. Perhaps the greatest error (though it is possible
perhaps to justify it on the grounds of expediency) was
that of giving to the governor a power final and despot-
ic. He ".... was to wield those extraordinary powers
in maintaining and enforcing the laws and municipal reg-
ulations of Spain, which were to remain in vigor until
modified by the Government of the United States and of
14
which he was entirely ignorant.
11 Of a piece with this
13
Laussat: “Dispatch to France," quoted in Gayarre,
Charles: Ojo. cit., pp. 7-14.
14
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error, and calculated to set the peoples’ teeth further
on edge was the arrogance of the Union military, which
flaunted itself in the peoples' faces on every possible
occasion.
Another source of great discontent was the sorry con-
dition of the currency.
Nothing is more apt to produce discontent in any
community than the want of a circulating medium; and
when discontent exists from any other source, nothing
is more powerful in contributing to bring it to its
climax than this very cause. So it was in Louisiana
at that time. The distress in the province had be-
come very great from the scarcity of money. The flow
of silver from Vera Cruz which was so refreshing under
the Spanish government, had ceased with the change of
dominion, and Spain showed no prompt disposition to
redeem a large quantity of paper which she had set
afloat, in the late colony under the name of lib-
ranzas, and which had fallen into considerable de-
preciation. I 5
This unhappy condition of the currency offered Gov-
ernor Claiborne a great opportunity, and he was not long
in taking advantage of it. Complaints about the currency
were perhaps the single, certainly the greatest, point
of dissatisfaction upon which all three elements of the
population were agreed. To remove this complaint would
be to remove many other grievances, both real and fancied.
On March 12, 1804, therefore, Governor Claiborne gave his
permission for the establishment of the Louisiana Bank,
the charter of which provided “that a bank may be estab-
lished in the City of New Orleans, Capital Stock whereof
15
Ibid., p. 15.
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shall not at present exceed $600,000 .... And be it fur-
ther ordained, that whenever the Directors shall deem it
expedient, they may increase the Capital Stock of the
said Corporation to two millions of Dollars .... And be
it further ordained that this ordinance shall continue
16
in force for a period not exceeding sixteen years.” A
list of the stockholders of this bank shows that the
bank was owned by the most influential men in all three
population groups.
Fearing that he had exceeded his powers, and that
his government would not approve his having established
a bank to exist for a long period, Claiborne, on March 16,
forwarded to Secretary Madison a copy of the charter, to
which he attached an explanation of his action:
I enclose you a copy of three ordinances which I
lately passed, one of which contains a Charter for a
Bank. The Establishment of a Bank in this City was
much wished for by the inhabitants, and I believe
will prove of great utility, but I must confess I
should not have ventured upon the measure from these
considerations alone. I discovered that efforts were
being made to render the people discontented with the
present state of things, and to impress them with
an opinion that their Interests were not attended to
by Congress, and that Louisiana had gained nothing
by the late change.
I thought that these efforts were likely to prove
successful, and that the best means of speedily allay-
ing discontent was the Passing on my part of some
popular ordinance. The project of a Bank presented
itself, and the measure received my .sanction from the
16
“Ordinance Providing for the Establishment of a
Bank,” quoted from The Official Letter Books of W.C.C.
Claiborne, compiled by Rowland, Dunbar, Vol. 11, pp. 29-34.
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best of motives, the subscriptions were opened on
this day, and I am told near one hundred thousand
Dollars was subscribed in a few hours. The Estab-
lishment is a novelty here and very pleasing to
the people. I was unwilling to do anything which
would require permanency and thus commit the gov-
ernment. In granting a charter, therefore, I
yielded reluctantly to existing circumstances
but I trust the measure will be viewed as perfect-
ly justifiable on the ground of Political expedi-
ency, and that my conduct in this particular
will meet the President's approbation.
This letter to Madison was answered by Secretary of
the Treasury Gallatin. Contained in the reply, which
Claiborne received May 22, was the news of Congress'
having authorized the establishment in New Orleans of
a branch of the First Bank of the United States. Also
contained was an order that Claiborne revoke the char-
ter of the Bank of Louisiana. This the Governor was
unwilling to do, and he answered Gallatin by further
explaining the reasons for his having chartered the
Bank, and by saying that he would await the President's
18
instructions. Claiborne then took the matter up di-
rectly with President Jefferson, who sustained him in
his refusal to revoke the charter.
Both the Bank of Louisiana and the branch of the
First Bank of the United States were opened in Janu-
ary, 1805. The Bank of Louisiana was not very success-
17
“Letter to James Madison," Ibid.» pp. 41-42.
18
"Letter to Albert Gallatin," Ibid. . p. 163.
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ful financially, though its capital was later increased
to $2,000,000, Of its success as a political expedient,
however, there can be no question. It succeeded admir-
ably in its object of pacifying the inhabitants. Had
Claiborne not taken this step to allay the dissatisfac-
tion of the colonists, it is quite probable that the in-
habitants of Louisiana would have revolted to form the
much talked-of 11 Western Empire" under the leadership of
Aaron Burr. The bank continued to operate until 1819,
at which time it was forced to liquidate.
Though agriculture made reasonable progress during
the next half a dozen years, there was little increase
in the amount of trade passing througn New Orleans.
During this time, the Louisiana Bank and the branch of
the First Bank of the United States fully met the fi-
nancial needs of the community. However, when it was
realized that the First Bank of the United States would
not be rechartered, business men in New Orleans and
throughout the country began to lay plans for the organ-
ization of new state banks.
On January 29, 1811, in a message before a joint ses-
sion of the legislature, Claiborne had this to say of the
banking situation:
I have noticed, gentlemen, a solicitude on the
part of many respectable citizens for a third bank
in this city. If indeed such an institution
promises advantages to commerce and to agricul-
ture, I shall be happy to approve an act of in-
corporation.
Evidently Governor Claiborne came to see some ad-
vantages promised by such an institution, for in 1811
the Bank of Orleans and the Planters' Bank were estab-
lished, the former with a capitalization of $5,000,000.
These two banks and the old Louisiana Bank were the on-
ly banking institutions in Louisiana until 1817, at
which time a branch of the Second Bank of the United
20
States was established there.
. The advent of the first steamboat into the New Or-
leans port in 1811 marked the beginning of a temporary
spurt in river transportation. However, the Fulton-
Livingston monopoly, granted by the State of Louisiana,
checked the expected increase until 1815, at which time
the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
neither a state nor Congress could prevent free trans-
portation on the Mississippi River. This decision set
in motion what has been generally recognized as a golden
period of commerce at New Orleans.
19
"Speech before a Joint session of the Legislature,"
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20
Rightor, Henry: History of New Orleans, p. 585.
33
CHAPTER IV
HEW ORLEANS FROM 1821 to 1860
New Orleans will forever be, as it is now, the
mighty mart of the merchandise brought from more
than a thousand rivers, unless prevented by some
accident in human affairs. This rapidly increas-
ing city will in no distant time leave the emporia
of the eastern world far behind. With Boston, Bal-
timore, New York, and Philadelphia on the left, Mex-
ico on the right, Havana in front, and the immense
valley of the Mississippi in the rear, no such po-
sition for the accumulation and perpetuity of wealth
and power ever existed.
Thomas Jefferson
By 1821 the "golden period of commerce" in New Orleans
was well under way. The almost magic power and glamor of
the period defy description; but if we look only at sta-
tistics of the time, comparing in dull numbers New Orleans
and her only new-world rival, New York, we can get a fair
idea of the city*s development. The following table gives
the exports and imports of New York and New Orleans from
1
1821 to 1860:
Imports and Exports of New York and New Orleans from
1821 to 1860 (000 omitted)
X
U. S* Treasury reports of the years listed.
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New York New Orleans
Export s Imports Export s Import s
1831 13,162 23,629 7,272 3,397
1832 17,100 35,445 7,978 3,817
1823 19,038 29,421 7,779 4,283
1834 22,897 36,113 7,928 4,530
1835 35,259 49,639 12,582 4,390
1836 21,947 78,115 10,284 4,167
1827 23,834 38,119 11,728 4,531
1828 22,777 41,297 11,947 6,312
35
Moreover, the banking capital of New Orleans from 1835
to 1842 exceeded that of New York; and it was a fairly
common belief that New Orleans was the richest city in
America. No wonder that a contemporary of the period,
looking at these figures, was moved to rhapsodize:
.... the eye instinctively rests on two points
whose positions are so commanding that it requires
but little prophecy to determine that they must be
far greater than Alexandria, Tyre, or even London.
These two points are New York and New Orleans. The
latter is the only city in American that can run a
close race with New York, and the ratio of its past
increase is such that it bids fair to be the empire
city of America. 2
In the light of the extravagant predictions made for
her destiny, the disparity in the relative importance of
of the New Orleans of early statehood days and the New
2
“Albany Argus,” quoted in Hunt 1 s Merchant s * Mag..V. XIII,
p. 50.
1829 30,118 34,743 13,386 6,857
1830 19,697 35,624 15,486 7,599
1831 35,535 57,077 16,761 9,760
1832 36,000 53,214 16,530 8,871
1833 35,395 55,918 18,941 9,590
1834 35,513 73,188 36,557 13,781
1835 30,343 88,119 36,397 17,519
1836 38,930 118,250 37,199 15,117
1837 37,338 . 79,301 35,338 14,029
1838 33,008 68,453 31,503 9,496
1839 33,368 99,882 33,184 12,864
1840 34,367 60,440 34,136 10,677
1841 33,139 75,713 34,387 10,256
1842 37,576 55,875 38,408 8,033
1843 33,443 31,350 36,653 8,170
1844 33,861 65,079 30,476 7,826
1845 36,175 70,907 37,157 9,354
1850 38,105 10,760
1855 55,400 12,925
1859 104,730 229,181 101,634 18,349
36
Orleans of today is little short of incredible. How did
it happen that New Orleans failed even to approach the
limits set for her? Should her failure be ascribed to
her own lack of enterprise and initiative, or were the
prophecies themselves groundless and, so, incapable of
fulfillment ?
Undoubtedly New Orleans stands indicted for lack of
vision and aggressiveness. Dowered by Providence with
one of the greatest natural commercial highways in the
world and the only outlet from the Northwest, the city
grew and prospered but not because of her own efforts.
That any one might devise a better mode of transportation
than the natural one of the river, did not occur to her;
and when the city finally awoke to the fact that the East
had wrested from her the commercial supremacy of the
Northwest, it was too late: First in the field, the
East had built too solidly in the Northwest for New Or-
leans seriously to challenge it. And the Civil War
caused a fatal halt in New Orleans’ belated efforts to
repair the damage by tapping the commerce of the South-
west •
What had New Orleans done, or, better, what had she
not done that caused her to lose out on the commerce of
her natural trade territory? The answer to this question
lies in an explanation of the fact that New Orleans was
an export city. From 1821, over a period of forty years,
while her exports were increasing some 1500 per cent, her
imports advanced only 600 per cent. At the beginning of
the period, of course, boats were not powered to go up
the Mississippi; and those boats that came down the
river were wrecked at New Orleans (and the peck-sawed
lumber sold for more than the cost of the boat). In
such a system, accordingly, imports into the interior
by way of the river were out of the question; but even
after the advent of the steamboat, imports increased but
slightly and were restricted to supplies for New Orleans
and the immediate vicinity. Before, boats had been junked
after landing their cargoes at New Orleans; now, they
3
simply returned up the river empty.
In failing to take advantage of the opportunities
for building up an import trade, therefore, New Orleans
lost possibly her greatest opportunity to become, if not
the emporium of the West, at least much larger than she
did. Not only could New Orleans have taken toll from a
system of imports into the interior, she could also have
increased her exports. For with imports she could have
built up a system of exchange with the Northwest, tak-
ing to the Northwest, as the East was doing, finished
goods and exchanging them for that part of the produce
~3
Internal Commerce of the United States, 1888, p. 252.
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that she did not buy outright. If river transpor-
tation was inadequate to take care of this traffic, it
remained either to improve the navigation of the Miss-
issippi or to establish overland means of shipment.
Until it was too late, she did neither.
Improvement of navigation on the Mississippi was
neglected until 1829. In that year Congress inaugu-
rated under Captain Shreve the snag-boat system.
Previous to that time the boatmen themselves had re-
moved, in their passage downstream, the innumerable
logs which obstructed and rendered the navigation
4-
of the river dangerous. Captain Shreve
1
s system of
snag-boats was very successful, but his success was
balanced by his unfortunate efforts to straighten the
Mississippi by cutting channels through the bends in
the river. He succeeded only in ruining the entrance
5
to the Red, Ouichita, and Atchafalaya rivers.
From 1833 to 1838 the Secretary of the Treasury
reported that 40 steamboats had been snagged on the
Mississippi and damage inflicted amounting to more
than $640,000. This was probably far below the true
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., p. 198.
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figures. In the year 1839 the total loss of boats in
the river was 40, of which 3 were snagged, 7 struck on
rocks and other obstructions, the total loss amounting
6
to $448,000.
Not only was the course of the river hazardous, but,
as the ships increased in size, the mouth of the river
became more and more an obstruction to passage up to
New Orleans. Early efforts to dredge the bottom of the
river were not successful, and the obstruction was not
fully removed until 1874, when Captain Eads' jetties
were erected.
Up until the Civil War, then, the efforts of Louis-
iana, other states along the Mississippi, and the Federal
Government to improve river navigation were, at best,
half-hearted. In Louisiana the expenditures for the
improvement of river transportation had cost the state
less than one-tenth the amount expended on banks, the
Federal Government had spent even less than Louisiana,
and the other states, practically nothing except on
their own tributaries. And not until 1845, after the
railroads began competing with the Mississippi for the
commerce of the Northwest, was any organized effort made
to improve the Mississippi.
6
Ibid., p. 198
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New Orleans* tardiness in providing adequate transpor-
tation for the produce of the Northwest very early had the
effect of causing her to receive a decreasing proportion
of the total amount of raw material shipped out of the
Valley. This loss was not realized at once, because the
importation of slaves and the improvement in agricultural
technique brought an increase in the amount of produce
from the vicinity of New Orleans that for a time effect-
ively concealed the relative losses from the valley.
None the less, there was a loss; and what New Orleans
lost, the East gained. After steamboats came in, the
North and the East began the construction of a system
of canals that, together with the railroads, by 1850
7
linked the whole Northwest with Eastern ports. And,
because of the cheapness and speed of this method of
transportation, the valley came not only to depend upon
the East as its source of manufactured products, but
also to look to the East as a market for increasingly
great amounts of its raw materials.
A farmer on the Ohio, at a point, say Cincin-
nati, equally or farther distant from New York
than New Orleans, can transport his produce to New
York and net as much profit as to carry it to New
Orleans. In the one case, nature has provided him
with a magnificent highway almost before his door,
and art has provided ample steamers ready to carry
it to New Orleans; and* yet, most perversely, he
7
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goes up the Ohio to Portsmouth; traverses a canal
of three hundred miles by slow marches; comes to
Lake Erie, unships his produce, and bears it 150
miles, on a boisterous lake, to Buffalo; unships
it again, to a boat on the grand canal, and then
toils along 360 miles, through a river 4 feet deep and
40 feet wide, to the Hudson; and then, after one more
shipment, he floats it down to its destination, the
New York market. All this can be done, and with as
much profit to the producer, as to float it down a
single river to New Orleans.
Even if New Orleans had seen in time the necessity for
insuring her commercial future by the improvement of river
navigation and the establishment of a system of railroads,
after 1837 it is doubtful that she could have, with her ex-
isting banking facilities, financed the undertakings. In
1837 the banking system of New Orleans collapsed, and five
years intervened before New Orleans’ notes ceased to be
heavily discounted. In 1837, the first year of the depres-
sion, all southern money was ”at a discount of from 5 to
9
25 per cent., and most of it from 10 to 20."
Since it was with these notes that New Orleans paid the
Northwest for its produce there being no commodity ex-
change the Northwest naturally preferred to trade with
the East. From the East it received either goods in ex-
change for its produce or currency undiscounted. It in-
creased its trade with the East during these five years
8
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at a rate faster even than, it had before, and New Orleans
was never able to regain what she lost.
It is interesting to note the attitude of New Orleans
at this time. Even then economists did not see what was
happening to New Orleans. Said one staid critic:
It is certain that the trade through the canals,
as well as by other similar ones that may be opened
hereafter, is destined to increase in a great degree,
and all this increase both as to produce sent and
supplies received by those routes is, without doubt,
at the expense of New Orleans; still, however, all
this will not prevent the trade of this city from
increasing in a most rapid ratio. The Mississippi
and its tributaries are the natural the others are
the artificial channels of the commerce of the
West 7*^
Bat the currency problem was not the only financial
impediment to New Orleans* development. There was also
the matter of securities. In 1837 some $17,000,000 in
bank bonds secured by the state were outstanding. Though
interest payment on these bonds had been guaranteed by the
state, no provision for the payment of interest had been
made other than from the profits of the banks. In 1837
in New Orleans the banks ceased to make a profit, and the
bonds were soon in default. Moreover, $7,000,000 of New
11
Orleans' securities were defaulted. From 1838 to 1843
Louisiana "sixes" were quoted in London at from 95 to 96-|,
10
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and from 1845 to 1852, at 90, though Ohio ‘'sixes'* were
12
quoted at 101. In order for the state to meet the in-
terest on the bank bonds, it would have had to take over
the banks. This was not done until 1842.
The taxpayers’ response to the legislature’s decision
to have the state take over the banks was loud and definite.
In 1845 it was made unconstitutional for the legislature
either to charter more banks or to finance any corporations.
From that time on, even if there had been any great senti-
ment in the city and throughout the state for improving
navigation and laying down railroads, it would in all prob-
ability have been impossible to finance the projects. The
state had no credit abroad. Under the new banking system,
banks were unable to finance such projects. Later, when
the necessity for these improvements became generally recog-
nized, the wealthy classes were unwilling to finance them,
13
and the others were unable. And though by the middle fif-
ties it might have been possible to finance the improve-
ments, by that time it was too late to recapture the trade
of the Northwest.
By 1850 conditions had become too clear even for New
Orleans to ignore them. It was clear not only that the
12
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13
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trade of the Northwest was definitely lost to her, but also
— and this was even worse — that she was losing out to
other southern cities. In 1850 New Orleans lost 12-J- per
cent of her cotton crop.
Charleston and Savannah together had gained 12.8
per cent. This was owing to the opening of the Western
and Atlantic Railroad between Chattanooga and the two
coast cities. 1^
New Orleans began to listen to the economists, even to
believe them when they told her that if she was to become
a great commercial mart, "only railroads could make her
15
so." It should be noted, though, that, so late as 1850,
the railroads were still conceived of as having utility
only as feeders for the river. Said the resolutions of
a committee formed to draw up a program for the city:
"What then must be done for New Orleans? She must,
by a wise and liberal stroke of policy, regain a part,
if not the whole, of the trade she has supinely lost,
and open new sources of opulence and power which are
abundant all around her. She can do this by changing
and modifying her laws bearing unequally and hardly
upon capital and enterprise; by cheapening her sys-
tem of government; by affording greater facilities
and presenting less restrictions to commerce; by es-
tablishing manufactures, opening steamship lines to
Europe, and conducting a foreign import trade; and,
finally, and what is of first importance and should
precede every effort by munificent appropriations to
railroads branching the West, and the North, and the
East, from a terminus at her center or from termini
on such interior streams and rivers as are necessarily
tributary to her. Now is the accepted time. Tomorrow
will be too late.
14
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By the time of the Civil War the utility of the rail-
roads was generally recognized throughout the South. By
that time any number of short roads had been constructed.
Commerce through the port of New Orleans had more than
doubled since 1852, and there was even talk of opening
up a new commercial field by laying a road into the South-
west.
It was all plain as day to southern statesmen, but
no effort of will and imagination could overcome the
flow of fortune. The economic basis was being laid
for a new partisan adjustment and in 1860 spinning
fates wrought the patterns.
17
Beard, C.A. and M.R.: The Rise of American Qivi-
lization, p. 640.
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- CHAPTER IV
WILD BANKING (1818-1837)
1. The Louisiana State Bank.
In 1818
.... when the Louisiana Bank was on its
last legs and preparing for liquidation, .... the
Louisiana State Bank was established on far greater
foundations than anything that had ever been seen
before in New Orleans.^
The old Louisiana Bank was given five years in which to
liquidate, and the stockholders were assured of the re-
turn of all but 11 or 12 per cent of their investment.
The Louisiana State Bank was capitalized at $2,000,
000; the number of directors, of which the State was to
appoint 6, was fixed at 18. These directors were to be
elected as soon as 5,000 shares, exclusive of state sub-
scriptions, were subscribed.
Five branches, “offices of discount," were also es-
tablished. Of the capital stock SIOO,OOO was reserved
for the branch at Donaldsonville, $200,000, for that at
St. Francisville, and $150,000 for each of the branches
at Alexandria and St. Martinsville. No stock subscrip-
tions were reserved for the branch at Baton Rouge. In
1825 a supplementary law was passed permitting the dis-
continuation of all the branches except the one at St.
1
Rightor, Henry: Op.. cit. , p. 585.
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Mart insville.
This bank was to be free of all state and local taxes.
It was, however, required to pay the state a bonus of
$lOO,OOO, $lO,OOO for each of ten years. A supplementary
law in 1819 permitted the bank to pay $5,000 annually in-
stead of $10,000; in 1820 the law was again changed to
permit the payment of $2,000 a year for four years, after
which an annual payment of $lO,OOO was required.
Stockholders were made liable only to the amount of
their stock. The stock was to be paid for by paying one-
fifth at the time of subscription, two-fifths after the
opening of the bank, and the remaining two-fifths on de-
mand of the directors.
Notes were made 11 obligatory on the part of the said
hank, and any of the said notes payable to order ....
transferable and negotiable by endorsement.
M And those
“payable to the bearer" were made "negotiable and trans-
-2
ferable by a mere delivery."
The Louisiana State Bank was very successful. It
weathered the storm of 1837 and afterwards established
branches at Baton Rouge and Shreveport. It went through
the Civil War. In 1867 it reduced its capital to $600,000,
3
and in 1870 it was converted into the State National Bank.
2
Louisiana Law of 1818, Section 13,
3
Trufant, S. A.: Review of Banking in New Orleans,
1830-1846, p. 13.
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2. The Bank of Louisiana
April 7, 1824, the Bank of Louisiana was chartered. At
the same time were established five offices of discount and
deposit, “to wit; one at Donaldsonville, for the parishes
of St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Lafourche Interior, and
Terrebonne, and Iberville, with a capital of $200,000; one
at St. Francisville, for the parishes of East and West
Feliciana and Point Coupee, with a capital of $200,000;
one at St. Martinsville, for the parishes of St. Mary, St.
Martin, Lafayette, and St. Landry, with a capital of $200,
000; one at the town of Alexandria, for the parishes of
Rapides, Avoylles, Catahoula, Concordia, Ouachita, and
Natchitoches, with a capital of $200,000; and one at
Baton Rouge, for the parishes of East and West Baton
Rouge, Washington, St. Helena, and St. Tammany, with a
4
capital of $200,000."
The state was more than generous in its concessions
to the Bank of Louisiana and subscribed half of the stock.
The charter provided for the establishment of a bank of
the State of Louisiana “with a capital of four millions
of dollars .... 20,000 shares amounting to two millions
of dollars .... shall be subscribed and paid for by the
5
State of Louisiana." Section 4 of the act provided that
4
Louisiana Law of 1824* Section 2.
5
Ibid., Section 5.
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the "treasurer of the state shall subscribe .... the said
number of 20,000 shares amounting to two millions of dol-
lars
....
to be paid in the manner following, to wit;
"the treasurer of the state shall deliver to the direct-
ors of the bank bonds .... payable by the state to the
order of the president, directors, and company of the
bank, which shall bear an interest of 5 per cent per
annum payable half-yearly, and shall be delivered at
the rate of SIOO in bonds for every eighty-three dollars
and one-third of a dollar of stock." Bonds amounting to
$2,400,000 were issued as follows: $600,000 to run for
10 years; $600,000, for 15 years; $600,000, for 20
years; and $600,000, for 25 years. These bonds were not
expected to bring their par value, but it was known that
they would bring more than 83 1/3. It was, therefore,
provided that any amount over $2,000,000 secured for the
bonds would go to the bank as a profit to be divided as
6
dividends to the stockholders.
Even this gift was not large enough to satisfy the
stockholders, and they immediately proceeded to divide
the profits amounting to $321,822 on the basis of stock
subscriptions and not on the basis of paid-in stock.
Since stockholders were required to pay only one-fifth
a
Ibid,
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of their subscriptions at the time of the opening of
the bank, the amount to be paid in by the time of the
opening of the bank amounted only to $>400,000, of
7
which $138,840 was actually paid in. This method
of dividing the profits would, therefore, have given
the individual stockholders a dividend of $160,411,
or a profit of 115 per cent on their paid-in invest-
ment. The state naturally objected to this scheme
and carried the matter to the courts, where it secured
a decision requiring the profits to be divided accord-
-8
ing to the amount of paid-in stock. This decision
saved the state a little more than $140,000. Even so,
the stockholders gained a profit of some 14 per cent
on their investment.
Like the State Bank of Louisiana before it, the
Bank of Louisiana was “exempt from taxation by the
state or by any parish or body politic under the au-
thority of the state for the whole term of its char-
-9
ter.” Another largess of the state was that permit-
ting the stockholders to operate the bank three years
mainly on the state’s money since the stockholders
were given three years in which to pay in their sub—
7
Louisiana v. Bank of Louisiana, 6 La. Ann. 645—59.
8
Ibid.
9
Louisiana Law of 1824, Section 20.
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scriptions.
The bank prospered.
The Bank of Louisiana shows a handsome exhibit
of its condition. It had only $570,322 in circula-
tion, but $420,880 in specie on hand besides the
cash in the different offices and other available
means making the grand aggregate of $867,038. The
bills and notes discounted, or mortgages on interest,
amounted to about $3,500,000 — capital paid in
nearly $4,000,000 — deposits to credit of individu-
als, $392,355.10
3. The Consolidated Association of Planters.
In 1827 the Consolidated Association of Planters was
chartered with a capital stock of $2,000,000 to be raised
by subscription. Mortgages were given on immovable prop-
erty with values equal to the subscription, and bonds were
floated against these mortgages. The bonds were made
payable in 5,10, and 15 year periods. The profits of the
bank were to be placed in a sinking fund for the purpose
of retiring the bonds and paying interest on them. These
bonds, however, could not be sold. To assist the bank,
the state in 1828 issued $2,500,000 of its own bonds and
took as security mortgage subscriptions to the amount of
$3,000,000. The bank gave the state $1,000,000 in bank
stock. No dividends were to be declared. The governor
10
Miles Register. Sept. 11, 1830, Vol. 38, p. 35.
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appointed a comptroller, who was to make annual state-
ments of the bank’s condition to the legislature.
In 1835 the bonds falling due were funded for 13
years, and some of them form part of the present debt
of the state. Exclusively a planters' bank, the bank
made mainly long-time loans; and when the state in
1842 took over the bank, it found that most of the
11
loans were frozen.
4. The Union Bank
The Union Bank of 1832 was the bank that drew per-
haps the most attention from the country as a whole;
12
it was copied by Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida;
and later the Federal Land Bank made use of the same
principle. Still enthusiastic over the success of the
Bank of Louisiana and the Louisiana State Bank, the
state gave the Union almost unlimited backing.
The Union Bank was chartered in 1832. In order to
make possible a wide diffusion of loanable funds, eight
branches were established. Of the 12 directors, 6 were
to be appointed by the governor.
The bank was capitalized at $7,000,000, to secure
which the state floated bonds secured by $8,000,000 of
11
See chapter following*
12
Baton Rouge Gazette, July 7, 1832.
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mortgages, and the stock could not be transferred for
four years. The mortgages could be on cultivated lands,
13
slaves, or lots occupied by revenue producing buildings.
Each subscriber was to be allowed to borrow one-half the
amount of stock subscribed.
The whole plan appears to have been devised with
financial ability and to be well calculated to pro-
mote the interest of the state which possesses ca-
pacities for profitable industries, far beyond its
capital. The plan derives additional interest at
this moment, from the fact that several of the
western states, as we understand, will be likely
to establish similar institutions for their own
benefit, and particularly to prevent the damage
which otherwise might result from the withdrawal
of the funds of the United States Bank, should
that institution fail to obtain a renewal of its
charter. 14
The subscriptions went much beyond the allotment in
each place.
The subscription books of the Union Bank were
closed Tuesday last, with a subscription, it is
stated, amounting to twelve millions of dollars
for the city, and twenty-five for the country.
A considerable amount of the bonds .... have been
sold at a premium of six and one-half per cent,
which, it is said, yields an immense profit to
the bank, and leaves but little doubt, if its
credit is well managed, qf the balance obtaining
a much greater premium.
During the first five years of its existence the
bank was very successful. One of the most prosperous
of any of the New Orleans institutions, it was one of
l3
Baton Rouge Gazette, July 7, 1832.
14
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the few that did not default on interest payments on
bonds between 1837 and 1843. And in 1843 it retired
its first allotment of bonds without discount or de-
-16
lay.
5. The Citizens' Bank.
The Citizens' Bank of Louisiana was chartered April
1, 1833. By the terms of the charter the directors were
empowered to float a $12,000,000 issue of bonds secured
by $14,400,000 in stock subscriptions open to all owners,
individuals, or corporations, of property in the state
of Louisiana.
Stock subscribers were allowed to mortgage land,
cleared or uncleared, city lots, houses, and slaves
attached to property. It being accepted that the value
of Louisiana's slaves and property could never depreci-
ate, subscriptions were accepted on mortgages given at
the current valuations on property. One-third of the
property mortgages could be slaves.
The bank was not permitted to make loans to total
more than double the capital, nor could its demand li-
abilities, exclusive of deposits, be more than double
the capital.
16
Fortier, Alcee: Louisiana, Vol. I, p. 64,
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The state reserved the right to a credit of $500,000.
Three million dollars were allotted to be loaned in the
parishes outside of the Parish of Orleans. The bank was
allowed to lend to builders of houses and to the Lake
Borgne Navigation Company. It was obligated to dig a
canal and was authorized to build a railroad. In con-
sideration for digging the Lake Borgne Canal, the bank
was exempt from all state and local taxes. In case of
failure to dig the canal, it was to pay the state $500,
000.
Stock subscriptions amounted to $25,875,000. The
bank issued $12,000,000 in bonds secured by $14,400,
000 in mortgages. However, the security behind the
bonds was not sufficient to meet the demands of for-
17
eign bond houses. More than two years after the bank
began its attempts to sell the bonds, the state on Jan-
uary 30, 1836
)
amended the charter and agreed to issue
state bonds and take the bank bonds as security. The
act provided for the immediate issue of $3,000,000
in bonds and gave permission to the governor and trea-
surer to issue $9,000,000 more state bonds as they
deemed necessary. The money was immediately secured,
17
Rightor, Henry: 0&. oit,, p. 594.
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and the bank opened for business.
The Citizens 1 Bank did perhaps more to facilitate
the commerce in the Mississippi Valley than any of the
banks in New Orleans. When the banks suspended in 1837
and New Orleans bank notes were at a discount of 7 per
cent in New York, the Citizens 1 Bank attempted to raise
the value of the notes in the West.
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 12, 1838, the Citi-
zens’ Bank of this place has made arrangements with
one or more of the hanks in Cincinnati to circulate
a million or more of its money to reimburse them by
exchange on the North, to be purchased here, and the
banks in Cincinnati to purchase exchange on their
place and send it to the Citizens Bank here....
This they expect will regulate all the exchange and
currency in the West .... They put down exchange on New
York from 7 to 6, but this did not last but a single
day, and has again returned to 7.18
The Citizens 1 Bank is one of the many claimants to
the distinction of having originated the word “Dixie 11
as a synonym for the South. On the face of its ten-
dollar bills, the most popular notes issued, the bank
printed in bold letters the word “Dix," the French
equivalent of ten. In time, claims the bank, the word
was in common use by all nationalities. When some
trader up the Mississippi was asked where he was going,
his answer would be that he was going after some “Dixies, 11
and in consequence of this custom people came to refer to
18
Raguet, Condy: Financial Register of U.S., V01.2,
p. 96.
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the South as "Dixie,” the land where ten-dollar bills
abounded.
6. The New Orleans Gas Light Company.
The planters were not the only group to secure
special banking privileges. Improvement banks were
set up in rapid succession. The New Orleans Gas Light
and Banking Company, incoporated in 1829, was given
banking privileges and the right to capitalize at any
amount between $lOO,OOO and $300,000. Through this
bank Mr. James H. Caldwell, the bank's president, fi-
nanced the completion of the gas light system that
gave New Orleans the best street lights in America.
So successful was his lighting system that Mr. Cald-
well soon became one of the dominant figures of the
st at e.
In 1835 a new charter was granted the New Orleans
Gas Light and Banking Company. Under the new charter
it was capitalized at $6,000,000. Branches were estab-
lished at Alexandria, Port Hudson, Springfield, Napoleon-
ville, and Harrisonburg. It was expected that the Bank
would establish lighting systems in these towns like
the system in New Orleans, but the bank did not meet
these expectations. In 1845 the stockholders requested
that its charter be given up.
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Mr. Caldwell gave up his franchise in consideration of
500 shares of the new hank. These shares were to he paid
for oat of the surplus profits of the hank over and above
8 per cent. When the first dividend was declared, only
$30 per share had been paid in by the subscribers, and
the directors paid Mr. Caldwell dividends on the basis
of $30. per share, or $15,000. The directors also re-
fused to give him the 500 certificates of shares. Mr.
Caldwell then brought suit and forced them to pay him
dividends on $50,000 and also to give him the stock cer-
19
tif icates.
The state became part owner in 7 different banks,
having put about $24,000,000 into them. In addition to
these state owned banks, the state chartered nine other
banks before 1837, Most of these banks were organized
for particular improvements. The Canal Bank, organized
in 1831 with a capital of $4,000,000, was to construct
a navigable canal from Rampart Street to Lake char-
-20
train at a cost of about $1,000,000. The Improvement
Bank, with a capital of $4,000,000, was organized in
21
1834 and was to construct the St, Louis Hotel. This
hotel cost $9,000,000.
19
Raguet, Condy: Financial Register of U,S., V01.2,
p. 29.
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In 1835 the Exchange Bank, with a capital of $2,000,
000, was chartered on the condition that it would build
22
a hotel in the American part of the city. The St. Charles
23
Hotel was constructed by this bank at a cost of $616,775.
At this time many travelers from the North and from
Europe were spending from three to six months a year in
New Orleans* delightful winter climate. Seeing in these
travelers a possibility for great profit, people urged
that New Orleans banks erect the finest hotels in the
country. The banksdid not fail them.
At the time of the Panic of 1837 there were in Louis-
iana, according to a legislative committee report of De-
cember 23, 1837, 16 banks, exclusive of branches. The
total nominal capital was $55,032,000; the paid-in cap-
-24
ital was $39,943,632. In 1837 the auditor*s report of
Pennsylvania stated that Pennsylvania had chartered
banking capital to the amount of $57,915,681, and the
Banking Commissioners’ Report for the same date for New
York shows that the state had a total banking capital of
25
$27,110,460. The figures on banking capital in Pennsyl-
22
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vania and New York are given to show the magnitude of
that of Louisiana. It is evident that Pennsylvania
had been very extravagant in chartering banks. An ad-
vocate of liberal banking in that state had the follow-
ing to say with respect to Louisiana:
The banking capital of Louisiana will have been
enlarged before the close of the present session of
the legislature, to about seventy-two millions of
dollars: upon which it is supposed discounts are,
and will be, made to the amount of one hundred and
fifty millions of dollars. If the government of
Pennsylvania is to be put down for incorporating
thirty-five millions of existing bank capital (this
refers to the chartering of the United States Bank
to take the place of the Second Bank of the U.S.)
—* if conventions are to be called and mob law in-
voked to punish Pennsylvanians for daring thus to
understand and pursue the true interest of their
state, what shall be done to Louisiana, which has
chartered new capital to an amount (according to
the federal population) more than ten times as
great as the old capital to which a new charter
has been granted by Pennsylvania?^
Of coarse the total capital of Louisiana had not
reached 11 seventy-two millions of dollars,” but such
a reoort was current in the East, for Niles Register,
27
after investigation, corrected this report.
The New Orleans banks had secured most of their
capital from other states and from foreign countries.
The report of the legislative committee previously re-
ferred to shows that the paid-in capital of all the
'26
Niles Register, March 5, Vol. 50, p.
27
Ibid., April 2, 1836, p. 73.
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banks amounted to $39,943,832, of which $20,725,080 had
been secured in Europe, $6,945,710, from other states,
and $12,273,042, from Louisiana. A reading of this re-
port will show that the outlays made by these banks
were made in preparing the city to take care of business
coming to it, and that practically nothing was expended
for bringing additional traffic its way.
The prosperity in New Orleans was perhaps more specu-
lative than in any other part of this country. However,
the hard times of 1834, following the retrenchment policy
of the Second Bank of the United States, were not felt
in Louisiana. Farmers found easy money with which to
purchase more slaves, as well as to improve and enlarge
their plantations; real estate dealers were still able
to finance both their city additions and country tracts;
and the state continued to find credit abroad for its
banks.
It was not until 1836 that any signs of the end of
a perfect day were noted.
Specie has become scarce in New Orleans, and
the papers of that city announce, with no little
satisfaction, the arrival of parcels from abroad.
$100
?
Q00 arrived on the 10th from Philadelphia,
and $55,000 from Natchez, and the banks have made
a joint arrangement for the importation of $3,000, 38
000 from Mexico to be paid for by bills on England.
38
Ibid.. November 5, 1836, Vol. 51, p. 160.
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In 1837 the Louisiana banks had a circulation of
$7,558,465, specie in vaults $2,729,983, individual
deposits $7,096,456. Loans on real estate are not
separated from commercial and personal loans in the
committee’s report, but the total of all loans is
given as $43,341,904. Banks held 17 per cent of spe-
cie against demand liabilities (deposits and note cir-
culation). This on the face of the items looked good,
but there is every evidence'that a large per cent of
the loans was on real estate and stock mortgages.
Oooge’s Journal of Banking reports a statement from
the New Orleans Bank for May, 1841) which gives the
amount of real estate loans separate from other loans.
The amount was $37,793,798. It is reasonable to sup-
pose that banks made very few loans between the time
of the panic and this date. On this assumption 87
per cent of all loans and discounts was of a long-
time nature. Under such non-liquid conditions banks
were ill prepared to meet a crisis. And when the crisis
did come in 1837, depositors and note holders alike
rushed for their specie, and the banks were forced to
suspend.
During the boom period of the late twenties and the
early thirties, everything had gone well with the banks.
What losses they had had, were due to theft, default, and
63
counterfeiting. The aggregate was only a small per
cent of the total capital of the banks. While New
Orleans banks had apparently been most prosperous
before 1837, they had created a most striking example
of the futility of liberality in making long-time
loans.
Chapter V
Banking Troubles (1837-1860)
"The visionary profits of one day stimulate
exlTravsganee, and th£ Tosses of another
engender spleen."
--Publicola to Mr. Gallstin.
Writing in 1844, B. R. Curtis declared that the ye?r 1837
ended "one of the most extraordinary financial periods—per-
haps the most extraordinary one—the world has ever seen, and
nowhere were its effects so fully exhibited as in this coun-
-1
try." This "extraordinary financial period" is generally
accepted as having begun in 1830—an arbitrary date, for the
period was born shortly after the Napoleonic Wars, arrived to
lusty maturity about 1830, and died in 1837. It Is commonly
called 8 period of madness; but the delusions of grandeur that
swelled the minds of the visionary prophets of that day are
treated by later critics with more sympathy than historians
are wont to accord the follies of the past.
After 1815 a continent left prostrate by the Napoleonic
Wars set about the weary process of reconstruction and by
1830 was well on the way to recovery, ±n England the Indus-
trial Revolution attained to full growth during this period.
In this country business and commerce increased at an almost
North American Review, Vol. LVIII, January, 1844, p. 110.
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incredible rate.
A number of circumstances helped to further this devel-
opment. One of the most important was the substitution of
foreign bills of exchange for the old system of specie ship-
ments, objectionable because of risk, delay, and expense:
M At a period when confidence was rising and profits
seemed certain, this new arrangement began to be resorted
to as a new mode of obtaining means with which to trade;
while, at the same time, the general confidence and the
apparent prosperity made it very easy to obtain bills.
Credit to an immense amount was thus created, and our
whole commerce felt the stimulating effects of this new
cause.” 2
Business was also stimulated by the acquisition of greet
amounts of foreign capital from the ssle of stocks end bonds
of banks and of enterprises both private and public. States
especially availed themselves of easy credit; from 1830 to
1842 the states' indebtedness increased from 113,000,000 to
$213,777,916; and the states could have borrowed more.
"In 1834 the last Installment of our public debt
was paid. No more money went out of the country through
this channel. This was an event of great importance to
the country, and certs inly its importance was not inade-
quately estimated either at home or abroad. Here, the
party newspapers made the most of it with the people, in
order to obtain credit for the preceding administration
by which it had been accomplished. Abroad, it was con-
sidered very striking from its novelty; for we were the
first, and are still the only, nation in modern times,
which has every wholly freed itself from debt. This fsct
tended to raise the spirits of the country, to give the
people great confidence in their resources, and to incite
them to large undertakings .”3
a
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Credit—end, by the same token, business-wes further ex-
panded by the sale of public lands. In payment for these
lands the Government accepted notes on state banks and al-
lowed the proceeds from the sale of the Isnds to remain on
deposit in the state banks. With the money received for the
sale of the land purchased fran the government, the land
companies paid off their notes to the banks and then borrowed
more. This cycle of easy credit, which permitted the banks
to pyramid their credits to empyrean heights was followed by
a flood of immigration. Land values soared beyond the view
of sober reason, and the mania of borrowers to borrow was
equalled only by the eagerness of lenders to lend.
In 1822 state banks' loanable funds were considerably
augmented when President Jackson transferred to them govern-
ment deposits then held by the Bank of the United States. In
1857 the Government again increased the amount of loanable
funds when it began the distribution of the $57,000,000 sur-
plus that it had been accumulating since 1834, the year in
which the last installment of the public debt had been paid.
The panic of 1837 upset the Senate's calculations in 1835
that the annual surplus for the next ei#it years would amount
to $9,000,000; but It came late enough to allow the states
to get a half of the $37,000,000.
The credit inflation consequent upon the transference of
67
federal deposits to state banks did not stop here, however:
President Jackson by this action and by his first message to
Congress had left no doubt of his intention to destroy the
bank of the United States; and speculators, seeing their op-
portunity, established banks everywhere in the country. Prom
1829 to 1837 the number of banks increased from 329 to 788,
and banking capital, from $110,000,000 to $290,000,000. Note
circulation increased from $48,000,000 to $149,000,000, and
loans from $137,000,000 to $525,000,000.
4
In every state of the Union during this period expansion
and speculation mounted to the skies. All men bestrode the
clouds, but nowhere with so brave a show as in New Orleans,
Prom 1830 to 1837 the number of banks in Louisiana increased
from 4 to 16, not including branches. Banking capital rose
from five to forty millions (almost half the capitalization
3
of the entire South and West). While trade was increasing
only 50 per cent, the amount of capital increased 800 per
cent.
"There was but one outlet to such sn excess of loan-
able capital—it must be used in speculation. The grest
staple, then as now, of the New Orleans market was cot-
ton, and under the influence of an excess of money the price
of cotton rose largely, and, by a strange anomaly, ruled
higher for several years at New Orleans, the port of ship-
ment, than at Liverpool, the port of consumption. Such
4
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being the fact, the trade was, for a long time, conducted
at a loss, and these losses fell upon the banks, and
locked up their available means. The excess of capital,
as must always be the case under such circumstances, was
gradually absorbed and obliterated by the speculation
which it had engendered, in the language of a writer of
that period, *AII the capital which, during the undue
excitement of the years subsequent to 1832, was drawn into
banking by the operation of speculation in raising prices
and creating an extraordinary demand for money, had, in
the general fall of property, ceased to exist, leaving,
however, active as much capital as was necessary for the
transaction of business ~
nC>
The bubble burst In 1837. Among the many reasons usually
given to account for the panic of 1837 are the "specie cir-
cular,
M
requiring payments on public lands to be made in spe-
cie; the redistribution of federal deposits; the raising of
the discount rate by the bank of England from 2-1/2 to 5 per
cent; the wheat crop failure; end the fsll of 25 per cent in
the price of cotton. Historians are, 8s usual, less in agree-
ment as to the causes than as to the results. Jenks summarizes
the results:
"The fall of 25% in the price of cotton in February
and March, 1837, hasped calamity upon the American
houses* and with them upon traders and speculators, plant-
ers and farmers throughout the United States. Three of
the merchant-banking Rouses were carried to the ground in
the financial storm which broke on both sides of the At-
lantic. American banks generally suspended payment.
Hundreds of tradesmen of high and low degree were forced
into insolvency. Nine out of ten factories in the east-
ern states shut down. Half the employees in sesbord com-
mercial houses were on the streets."'
“
g
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Nowhere was the stringency greater than In Louisiana. Of
the twenty million dollsr loss to American firms consequent
upon the fall in the price of cotton, a greater portion wss
suffered by New Orleans thsn by any other American city. All
but four or five of the principal cotton factors failed, fac-
tors "through whose credit and capital the planters of Louis-
iana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama were enabled to
purchase lands and slaves, to improve their plantations, and
to anticipate the proceeds of their crops, involving responsi-
bilities estimated at thirty millions of dollars."
8
When the
inevitable runs set in, banks were forced to suspend.
Immediately after suspending, the banks set about collect-
ing on all due paper. They were forced to this course by con-
siderations of their own survival. Louisiana laws required
banks to forfeit their charters after 90 continuous days of
suspension, banks were also required to pay 10 per cent in-
terest on all notes not paid at the time they were presented.
By February, 1838, 110,429,318 of protested notes were held
9
by New Orleans banks. From March, 1837, to the end of the
year, 2200 foreclosure suits were entered in the Parish of
Orleans alone at an estimated cost to the debtors of $330,-
000.
10
%he Financial Register of the U. S., vol. 11, p. 129.
Niles Register, Vol. LIII, Feb. 17, 1838, p. 400.
Financial Register of the S., Vol. il, p. 254.
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These foreclosures were about as popular as those of the
current depression. Public indignation at the banks* course
resulted, May 4, in the holding at Alexandria of a mass meet-
ing by people from all over the state to petition the gover-
nor to call a special session of the legislature. The gover-
nor published a notice of refusal on June 12. He accounted
for his refusal by stating that the currency situation was a
national, and not a state, problem. He also expressed the
belief that Bny action on the part of the legislature would
only make matters worse. From this time until the close of
his term, it was a question which was the more unpopular,
the governor or the banks.
Some concessions were made by the banks to the demands of
the irate public, but the concessions were verbal and not mon-
etary. June 14 the Commercial Bulletin attempted to justify
the ways of banks to man: it furnished an "extract of the
liabilities of all the banks in the state, contrasted with
their available assets.” The "extract” wss very reassuring;
unfortunately, however, it did not coincide with the figures
given by the banks to the Secretary of the Treasury.
When the legislature met in 1838, the lines between the
friends and enemies of the banks were sharply drawn; and the
people followed the proceedings with grim interest. In Feb-
ruary the legislature passed the banking bill of 1838, a
71
11
measure very similar to that enacted in 1842. March 4,
1838, the governor vetoed the bill on the ground thst the
12
banks were in sound condition. Two days later, the vetoed
bill passed the Senate by a constitutional majority, but
13
failed to pass in the House. The legislature of 1838 ad-
journed without having passed a single piece of bank legis-
lation.
"Conjectures were made ss to what would be the next
move after the governor vetoed the bill. Movements
were begun to defeat the opponents of the bank bill in
the July election, but many moves were made. 'The wind
of Heaven' blowing 'where it listeth* is not more uncer-
tain than are the movements of those whose profound heads
regulate the legislature of Louisiana
down to Martin Van Buren."
Meanwhile the banks completely ignored the fact that the
law required them to forfeit their charters after a suspen-
sion of 90 days; and the Board of Currency, composed of the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State--who were charged
with the responsibility of enforcing the bank laws, took no
official notice of the banks
1
remaining suspended two years.
January 7, 1839, A. B* Roman became governor, and a new
legislature met. The bank bill was again introduced, but it
never reached the governor. However, the legislature did
following chapter.
12
The Daily Picayune, March 5, 1838.
13
Niles Register, Vol. LIV, March 19, 1838, p. 48.
14
The Weekly Picayune, March 12, 1838.
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deal with the banks* infraction of the Isw: it abolished the
law. It reinstated "such of the banks ss may have forfeited
their charters by a suspension or refusal of the payment of
their notes as obligations in specie, 8t any time prior to
the passage of this act, ... to all the powers, rights, and
privileges conferred upon them by their respective charters,
notwithstanding any forfeiture thereof, to the same extent as
15
if no such forfeiture had ever existed."
September 18, 1839, every bank in New Orleans again sus-
pended. (They had resumed a few days prior to the meeting of
16
the legislature in January.) The state then brought suit
to test the validity of the charter of the New Orleans Gas
Light and Banking Company. The court hold that tjie law of
1839 reinstating banks provided that banks suspending in the
17
future forfeited their charters the day of suspension. The
victorious Attorney General made no effort to enforce this
decision, and the suspended banks continued to operate. As
the Financial Register put it: "There was every evidence
that the banks attempted to control the law, but when unsble
to make the laws, they disobeyed them."
Not until 1842 did the legislature pass a banking law.
15
Act 22, Sec. 1, Louisiana Legislature, 1859.
16
Niles* Register, Vol. LVi, No. 2, 1839, p. 154.
17
State v. N. 0. Gas Light and ranking Co., Robertson's
Reports, Vol. 11.
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The failure to deal any sooner with the banking crisis the
Times Picayune explained by calling the legislature "bank-
bought” 5 and Gayarre wrote in 1865 that it "was generally be-
lieved at the time, on the part of persons who had made the
calculations, that the members of the legislature in their
private capacities, owed to the institutions about one mil-
-18
lion dollars." Moreover, the banks employed indirect
methods in controlling the legislature? they exerted pres-
19
sure through the voters, most of whom owed the banks.
The banks could threaten borrowers with foreclosure; and then
when the borrowers* submissive ness made foreclosures unnec-
essary, could bask in the sunshine of the world’s smiles of
joy at their magnanhnity.
By 1842 the need for a change in the bsnk system was too
great to be any longer ignored. Economic conditions were at
an almost bottom level. To name only two items, cotton was
20
down to 4-1/2 cents, and bank notes had fallen in value 40
to 50 per cent. The state no longer had any credit. Unsble
to pay its own way, it was also unable to borrow from the
Louisiana banks. And having defaulted on the bank bonds it
had guaranteed, it was unable to get money abroad. Some
18
Gayarre, Charles: History of Louisiana, p. 660.
19
The Supreme Court in the ease of La. v. Farrar estimated
that nine-tenths of the farm owners owed the banks, 5 La.. Ann. 535.
20
The Daily Picayune, December 14, 1841.
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remedial legislation was imperative.
December 15, 1841, the governor called upon the legisla-
ture to relieve the situation. Said the Daily Picayune of
his message:
"He lays it into the banks in right good interest,
pronounces the long suspension illegal—a violation of
a solemn contract and demoralizing on society. Their
charters, he says, are virtually forfeited, and he ear-
nestly calls upon the legislature to enforce an immediate
resumption. The argument that it would not be politic on
the part of our city banks to pay their liabilities in
specie till a general resumption takes place throughout
the Union, he deems fallacious and educes the case of New
York and Boston banks in proof of his position. He further
shows frcm the published statements of the banks, that
since the suspension their financial condition, instead
of improving, has been retrograding—in other words, that
while their abilities hsve decreased, their liabilities
have increased.,.,
"He proceeds to notice the late frauds on the part of
the bankers and asks for an act to prevent such crimes
hereafter, ss experience has shown the inefficiency of
existing laws."
The bank law passed. It did not pass without a struggle,
however. Said one member of the House in a debate over the
bill:
"Pew or none stand forward in justification of the
course which the hanks have pursued, and all remedies
proposed for their better government appear to frighten
honorable members from their adoption* The question
seems to be, who will bell the cat? Who will bell the
cat? And if any member has the temerity to stand up and
say, ’I am ready to do it,* several good netured legis-
lators start up in their places and say, ’You shall not,
sir, you shall not. Why, bless your soul, sir, you
would not only place your own life or your own interest,
which is almost the same thing, in jeopardy, but you
would destroy your interest—you would annihilate the
planting interest—the mercantile interest--you would,
in a word, sir, bring ruin to the whole country.’ Thus
the cat is allowed to cut up his ’didoes,' and the few
who have the courage are not permitted to bell him."
February 8, 1842, the governor signed the bank bill.
March 12 the presidents of the New Orleans banks in a meeting
aceepted the bank law, and, as the Dally Picayune ssid, "put
an end to one long controversy which threatened serious con-
sequences."
The U. S
# Treasury report on the New Orleans banks re-
cords a great change in almost every item from 1841 to 1843.
Capital decreased from $41,700,000 to $20,929,000; loans and
- a
21
discounts fell from $48,646,000 to $20,420,000, snd note
circulation from $6,443,000 to $1,087,000. Specie increased
from $3,163,000 to $4,451,000, and deposits, from $3,094,000
22
to $5,338,000.
After the passage of the Law of 1842 the state took over
the banks which had defaulted on the bonds it had guaranteed.
By this action it assumed the responsibility of paying off
23
some $17,000,000 of defaulted bonds; and when the legisla-
ture met in 1843, it immediately took up the problem of liqui-
dating the banks snd funding the bonds.
21
Nothing like this figure was paid off. The decrease
is explained by the fact that the seven failing banks made
no report.
22
Report of the U. S. Comptroller of the Treasury, NO .
1753, p7“cxiTi.
23
International Review, November, 1880, p. 562.
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The Law of 1843, in addition to setting up the machinery
for liquidating banks taken over by the state, permitted debt-
ors to pay off their obligations to the state in bonds at
par value. Interest on these bonds had gone unpaid for two
years; and because of this—and the fact that nine other
states had defaulted and two repudiated their bonds--England
had declared a boycott on American exports. This boycott
had caused a further drop in the price of cotton and made
it utterly impossible for Louisiana to pay off the bonds.
After the boycott was broken, England proposed a method by
which the states could pay off the bonded indebtedness in
cotton. "A steady stream of bonds started from England in
payment for cotton and were automatically retired when Ameri-
-24
can planters used them to pay off their debts."
That portion of the hank Law of 1843 permitting the debt-
ors of the state to pay off their obligations in bonds at psr
value caused the state to be severely criticized. B. R. Cur-
tis, afterward Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, said of the law that "it impaired the obligation of
a plain contract between the state and the banks on the one
part, and the bondholders on the other; it is therefore in
conflict not only with the Constitution of the U. S., but
l. H.: The Migration of British Capital to
1375, p. 107.
with the fundamental law of Louisiana, which prohibits the
legislature from enacting any laws impairing the obligation
of a contract
#
w The st8te, said Curtis,
nh8d no right to
receive depreciated bonds at par in payment for well secured
25
debts which it held in trust for third personsR. P.
26
Porter echoed this objection.
These objections merit comment if for no other reason
than the eminence of the critics. The bonds issued by the
state on behalf of the banks were secured by stockholders
1
mortgages, by the assets of the bank. When the state took
over the banks, it took not only the assets of the banks; it
assumed their liabilities as well. For the state to have
cancelled the bonds for any amount less thsn their psr value,
would have been "to impair the obligation of a plain con-
tract ,”--the obligation of the state to pay off its bonded
debt. Had the state received these bonds at less than their
par value, it would have been repudiating a part of its debt
and allowing the stockholders to settle their obligation for
less than the amount specified in their contract. Judge Curtis
Brgues that the stockholders should not be obliged to pay
off their debts; he does not discuss the plight of the bond-
holders.
The laws of 1842 and 1843 by no means relieved the state
of its bank troubles. The problem of collecting the assets
be
North American Review, January, 1884, Vol. LVIII, p. 139,
26
“
'
The International Review, Nov,, 1880, p. 563,
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and funding the bonds was a constant source of trouble for
nearly forty years. A portion of the bonds was a part of the
27
consols of 1876, funded in 1913 end outstanding today.
Of all the banks the most troublesome was the Consolidated
Association of Planters. The bonds of the Association fell
due in 1847. The legislature funded these bonds and made the
new issues payable in series of 6,9, 12, 14 and 18 years.
A Board of Managers, set up by the law, appraised the assets
of the bank and secured new mortgages to be retired in equal
annual installments over a period of 18 years, beginning in
1848. The Board also calculated the deficit and, in accord-
ance with the law holding the stockholders responsible for
any deficit, assessed each stockholder $6. per share per year
for 17 years, the first payment to be made in 1849.^
8
The
29
stockholders accepted the assessment, but in 1850 attempted
through the courts to force the state to assume one-sixth of
the assessment on the ground that the state owned one million
dollars of the bank's stock and was legally entitled to one-
fourth of its profits. The court held that the one million
dollars of stock was given as a bonus to the state and could
not be taxed The stockholders psid 12 installments, but
Bnd Binder v. Bosrd of Liquidation, 30 La
Ann* 611.
2B
Louisiana law of 1847.
29
Consol. Assn. v. Lord, 35 La, Ann., 425.
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on the outbreak of the Civil War cessed their payments.
In 1866, the date set by the Law of 1847 for the comple-
tion of the liquidation of the Consolidated Association, the
legislature extended the time for ten years. Not until 1878,
however, did the state attempt to collect the unpaid assess-
ments. in this year the legislature passed a law assessing
each stockholder of the Association $40. per share. The stock-
holders refused to pay; and in the subsequent suit, the court
ruled in fsvor of the stockholders, holding that in 1847 a
contract had been completed by the stockhofcers' acceptance
of the law of that year. The stockholders were not required
to pay the five remaining installments, being relieved by
prescription.^0
The court condemned the bank management for its extrava-
gance. SBid the court:
"The horde of off icers—president, vice-president,
cashier, receivers, directors ,—pass before us in this
record of lengthened procession, laden with salaries and
plethoric with stipends, and the lean snd slippered stock-
holder, gaunt from 40 years* exhaustion, at last holds
up his hands in eager, passionate supplication for relief
from this insatiate, ever-recurring hunger for more con-
tributions. For only five and one-haif years of the forty-
one that have elapsed since the decree of 1842 terminated
the corporate existence of the association, the expenses
are thus summarized:
B. F. Flanders, receiver $7,988.03
A. Eustis, receiver $4,165.33
jj. A. Wilts, receiver $2,165,31
30
Consol. Assn. v. Lord, 35 La. Ann. 425.
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J. Calhoun, secretary,
cashier, receiver $16,508.20
Lawyers $19,546.08
Employees $3,907.86
W. Stevens, president $3,239.93
Master in chancery $1,110.00
$58,630.74
"This is the domestic expenditure from June, 1876, to
January, 1882."
In 1847 the Citizens 1 Bank reorganized under its old char-
ter and exchanged $BOO,OOO of its own bonds for the same amount
of state bonds. The state issued no bonds for the Louisiana
State hank. The Bank Of Louisiana retired all of its bonds.
The Merchants and Traders
* Bank assumed under the Law of 1844
the $150,000 of bonds Issued for it by the state. The Gas
Light Bank was taken over by the state in 1844.
In 1857 $6,124,311.10 of state bonds issued for the banks
31
were unpaid. In 1874 the amount outstanding was $4,803,083.-
32
33.
31
La. v. Clinton, Auditor, and Dubuclet, Treasurer, 28
La. Ann. 219.
—rrrr
For discussion of settlement of this amount, see Chap-
ter VIII.
Chapter VI
The Bank Act of 1842
February 5, 1842, the Louisiana legislature passed "No.
22 -- AN ACT to revive the charters of the several banks in
the city of New Orleans, and for other purposes."
1 "This
act," says the Bankers
* Magazine, "will always remain among
the most enlightened pieces of banking legislation to be
o
found on the statute books of any country." Horace White
said of the law that it was eminently scientific and in nearly
all respects a model for other states and countries.
3
Thought the Louisiana Supreme Court hBd held that under
the law of 1839 any bank suspending specie payment forfeited
its charter the day of suspension, the banks remained sus-
pended, except for a few months in 1839, until the Bank Act
of 1842 forced them to resume. Other bills had said, in sub-
stance, what the Act of 1842 said; none of them had provided
for its own enforcement as did the Act of 1842.
Under this act banks were required to accept the law within
1
This act was several times amended, the last time in
1853. However, the law is commonly referred to as the Loui-
siana bank Act of 1842.
2
"The Louisiana Bank Act of 1844 (sic.f Bankers* Maga-
zine, Vol. 32, Nov., 1877, p. 347.
3
White, Horace: "National and State banks," American
Academy of Political Science. Vol. 111, March, 1893, p. 9.
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twenty-five days after its promulgation, "and within three
days thereafter to give written notice of said acceptance
to the governor of the state," It was made the duty of the
attorney general to sue any and every bank refusing to accept
the law for the forfeiture of its charter. "And should the
attorney general neglect so to do for ten days after the ex-
piration of the above time provided, it shall be the duty of
the governor to consider his place as having been vacated de
facto, and to appoint another attorney general in his place,
who shall also be considered as having vacated his place, if
not acting within five days of his appointment. And the gov-
ernor to continue so to act until the full intent of this
section shall have been carried into full effect."^
Any surviving bank that refused or neglected to comply
with the conditions of the act was to go into immediate liqui-
dation on the conditions provided for in the act. If the
bank refused to liquidate, the attorney general was to sue the
bank for the forfeiture of its charter. And should the at-
torney general not do so within ten days of his notification
by the governor, the governor was to consider the attorney
general’s office vacated.
As a condition of the restoration of their charters,
banks not in liquidation under the provisions of the Bank
4
Section 9.
5
Section 10.
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Act of 1842 were required
nto receive at par at their respec-
tive counters, in payment of all debts and obligations due
and owing them respectively, the circulation of the bsnk or
banks that may efctsr into liquidation voluntarily or other-
wise, under the provisions of this act. And the said circu-
lation shall be distributed among the several banks not in
liquidation, according to the circulation of each bank; which
circulation for the purpose of this liquidation shall be
deemed to be as follows, to wit:
"The Union Bank of Louisiana, ei#it hundred thousand
dollars.
The Citizens* Bank of Louisiana, seven hundred thou-
sand dollars.
The Louisiana Bank, seven hundred thousand dollars.
The Consolidated Association, five hundred thousand
dollars.
The New Orleans Canal and Banking Company, five hundred
thousand dollars.
The Commercial bank of New Orleans, seven hundred thou-
sand dollars.
The City Bank of New Orleans, five hundred thousand
dollars.
The Mechanics and Traders* Bank, four hundred thou-
sand dollars.
The Carrollton Bank, two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars.
The Exchange and Banking Company, two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars.
The Improvement Bank, two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars.
The Atchafalaye bank, one hundred and fifty thousand
dollars.
The Bank of Orleans, one hundred and fifty thousand
dollars .
nt>
The cash assets of the liquidating banks were to be dis-
6
Section 8.
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tributed in the same ratio among the hanks receiving the cir-
culation. The whole amount advanced to the liquidating hank
or hanks in receiving the circulation was to he guaranteed by
the liquidating hanks* mortgage assets or by such securities
7
as were approved by the hoard of currency. The hanks receiv-
ing the circulation were permitted to charge 8 per cent on the
loans mBde by the liquidating hanks and **to lodge the secur-
R
ities thus received in guarantee of the issue.” This sec-
tion of the act was later so amended that no bank was bound
to receive in payment the notes of any hank or hanks in li-
quidation to an amount which would exceed in the aggregate
33-1/3 per cent of the circulation of the bBnk thus receiving
it, this amount to include the notss of the liquidating hanks
held by and all balances due to the hank receiving the notes.
Moreover, no hank was to receive a larger amount of the circu-
lation of a liquidating hank than that for which available
security was given, the sufficiency of which security was, in
case of difference to be determined by the hoard
of currency.
9
If at the time of the final settlement of the affairs of
the liquidating bank, the assets of the liquidating bank were
not sufficient to discharge all its liabilities, the bank tak-
ing up its circulation was to "suffer a loss pro rsta with all
~
8.
®See page
y
Act No. 95, Section 4.
85
a peti-the other creditors on the amount due it at the time ti-
tion for a surrender of its charter by a bank" was filed, or
a decfee of forfeiture thereof wss rendered.*^
No part of the law is more commendable than Section 3,
which prescribes the terms of liquidation of the mortgages.
Debtors were, of course, in no position to pay their obliga-
tions; and had the state demanded full and immediate payment,
it would have had no other recourse thsn to foreclose on the
mortgages. Realizing the necessity for an extension on the
loans, the legislature wrote into the act the requirement that
the banks place these mortgages in their and
renew the debts then due and that might mature thereafter, "on
the application being made to that effect by the respective
parties, on the following conditions:
”1. The payment of ten per cent, exclusive of Inter-
est, on the maturity of the debts, and the balance at
twelve months, renewable until fully paid, on the pay-
ment of fifteen per cent, each year on the original amount
Provided, ample and satisfactory security on real estate
can be furnished by the applicant.
”2. The payment of ten per cent, exclusive of inter-
est, on the maturity of the debts, snd the bslance by
equal installments of six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-
four months, provided the applicant furnish good and suf-
ficient personal security. Provided, that for the debts
due to the branches or by persons residing in the country,
2? Personal security, twelve months shall be granted to
the debtors on the payment of ten per cent, cash, ex-
clusive of interest, and such debtors to retain the right
No. 93, Section 4.
11
Loane from capital of the bank; see page
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to renew the same from year to year, on the payment of fif-
teen per cent, on the original amount until fully paid."**
It was further provided that debtors could not secure additional
loans until the whole of their original debts was paid.
Perhaps the most pressing problem th8t faced the framers
of the bank Act of 1842 was that of the currency, in that
year the Associated banks of New Orleans agreed to sustain a
circulation in which the notes of all the banks were given an
equal market value. The result was, of oourse, that the notes
of the weak banks drove the notes of the strong banks out of
circulation* By January, 1842, even the notes of the strong-
est banks had p os t notes, issued without leg-
islative authority, came into use; and January 24, 1842, the
legislature passed Act No* 17, "to prevent further violation
of the law by the banks," which made it unlawful for any bank
to issue any note or other obligation for circulation except
such as were payable in gold or silver and on demand. Curren-
cy became even scarcer than before.
"Such was the pressure throughout the whole community
from the absence of a sufficiency of a sound currency to
meet the general wants that even the taxes could hardly be
collected, and the revenues of the state had diminished to
the amount of nearly two hundred thousand dollars in the
year 1842.”
14
12
Section 3: 1, 2.
13
Rigator, Henry: History of Louisiana, p. 597.
14
Gayarre, Charles: History of Louisiana, p. 661.
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To meet this situation, the legislature permitted the
banks to issue post notes, payable September 50, 1842, up to
15
double the amount of specie on hsnd. The amendment to this
act, passed March 7, 1842, extended the date of payment of the
post notes to Monday, December 1, 1842, snd permitted the amount
of such notes to be increased to three times the amount of
specie on hand.
The first of the "fundamental principles" of the law was
that requiring banks to separate their loans of capital from
16
the loans of deposits. The former type of loan was called
the "deadweight," the latter, the "movement." Loans on cap-
ital were to be made on personal security, mortgages, loans
on stock by the property banks, and all other investments of
whatever nature not realizable in ninety days. Only commer-
cial loans running for ninety days or less were to be msde
17
from the "movement."
That part of the law permitting loans on mortgages has
been s everely criticized on the ground that mortgage loans
are not a part of the business of commercial banks. "In
principle the capital of a bank is only a guarantee fund to
protect the public against ultimate losses in dealing with
18
it." For that reason "in the best modern practice, the
Section 5.
16
-„Section 1:1.
I 'rbid.
lja
The Louis lens Bank Act of 1844 (sic)," Bankers' Mag-
azine, Nov., 1877, pp. 349-350.
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19
proprietors* capital is not invested in current loans." At
the time of the passage of the Act of 1842, the United States
did not have a larfee funded debt, Bnd the bonds of the states
were not considered ssfe investments. "There was, therefore,
no class of public securities in which bank capital oould be
invested. Nor did there exist at that time, or since, in
New Orleans, any savings banks, or trust companies, such as,
-20
in northern cities, absorb the best class of mortgages."
In spite of the fact, however, that the banks could not in-
vest their capital in government bonds, they should not have
been permitted, say the critics, to put their capital into
mortgages. "Mortgage loans are all right in themselves, but
21
they are no part of the banking business."
The most important provision of the Act of 1842 was that
requiring one-third of all the liabilities to the public, that
is, notes and deposits, to be kept in specie and the remainder
to be in ninety day paper. This was the first law passed in
the United States requiring banks to keep a specie reserve
22
against notes and deposits.
19
Ibid., p. 350.
20
Ibid.
21
White, Horace: "National and State Banks," Annals of
the American Academy, Vol. 111, March, 1893, p. 4.
T
Or anywhere else, though the Bank of England followed
the practical rule of keeping a reserve of 33-1/3 per cent.
89
That part of the Act of 1842 governing note Issues was
copied from the system used by Prance, which Horace White
calls the banking principle. This system places no legal
limit on the amount of notes a bsnk may issue, requiring only
that the bank have a certain reserve against the notes it does
issue. This principle assumes "that all trade Is barter, and
that notes are used only because they make barter easy. A com-
munity will use Just as many notes as it needs to effect ex-
-24
changes, and no more." Massachusetts adopted this princi-
ple in 1858.
In framing the Act of 1842 the legislature did not omit
to provide for the enforcement of the act. Each director of
the banks was held fully liable for every illegal loan unless
he could prove by the minutes of the board of directors that
he had voted against the illegal loan. "No bank shall in-
crease the investment of its ’deadweight* so long as the
whole of its cash liabilities shall not be represented by
one-third of the amount of such responsibilities in specie
23
The opposite of the banking principle is the currency
principle, followed by the Bank of England, This system as-
sumes that a certain amount of notes will be demanded by the
community at sll times. New York adopted this principle in
1838. Instead, however, of furnishing the amount of currency
assigned to be demanded, New York required deposits of state
bonds to guarantee the payment of the notes and, in this way,
benefited from an artificially created demand for its bonds.
In 1853 Louisiana changed to this system for free banks.
24
White, Horace, "National and State Banks," Annals of
the American Academy, Vol. 111, March, 1893, p. 17.
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and at least two-thirds in satisfactory paper, payable in
full at maturity, and within ninety days, and each snd every
director shall be personally responsible for all loans end
investments made in contravention of this rule, unless he can
25
show that he has voted against the same if present.” All
loans made for less than ninety days were to be payable at
maturity, and any "maker or endorser of any note, or acceptor
of any bill of exchange offered and discounted as paper strict-
ly payable 8t maturity" who applied for renewal or extension
of time was to have his account closed, and other banks were
26
to be notified of the action."
The common practice of wild cst banks at that time, of
issuing notes and then buying them up at a discount, was pro-
hibited in the Louisiana Bank Act of 1842. banks were not
permitted to pay out any but their own notes over their coun-
ters. In addition, New Orleans banks were required to exchange
their respective notes with esch other each day and once a
27
week to settle their accounts with each other in specie.
A Board of Currency was established by the lsw. This
board wss to be appointed annually by the governor and to con-
sist of three persons having the following qualifications:
'25
Section Is 2.
26
ibid.
27
Section 12.
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they must be citizens of the United States and of the state
of Louisians and must have resided four years therein; they
could not be directors of a bank or commercial partners of
any bank director or officer of a bank; and they could not
28
be money brokers.
"The duty of the board of currency shall be, to take
care that the paper money issued under the authority of
the state shall not be depreciated; and for this purpose
the following powers are hereby vested in them, to wit:
1. To supervise the fsithful execution of this act,
and of the charters and by-laws of all banks working
under it.
2. Thoroughly to examine the affairs of any bank when-
ever they may deem it expedient to do so, and at least
quarterly.
3. To require of the president and cashier of each
bank, on Saturday of each week, the following statement
in a printed form signed by them:
1. Capital realized $ .
2. Amount of ’deadweight 1 under the respective heads
of real estate, loans on stock, long loans, personal or
otherwise, protest paper, and in fine, of all assets not
realizable within ninety days.
3. Movement of the bank, to wit:
Loans ,on paper payable, at maturity and intended to
meet the two-thirds or 08sh liabilities unrepresented
by specie.
Circulation.
Deposits and other cash liabilities.
Specie and other cash assets.w^y
These statements were to be filed with the board of cur-
rency on the last Saturday of each month, and the board was
required to publish them in the state paper on the first Mon-
day in each month. The board was also required to lay before
each legislature a report on the meetings of the stockholders
28
Section 2.
29
Ibid.
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of the various banks**'
The Act of 1842 was accepted by five banks—the Citizens’,
Improvement, Louisiana State, Consolidated Association of
Planters, and Carrollton; eleven banks rejected the law—the
Union, City, Commercial, Gas, Orleans, Canal, Bank of Louisi-
ans, Exchange, Atchafslaya, Merchants and Mechanics 1 , and
Traders *
Though the banks resumed specie payment in May, several
months before the law required them to, the currency situa-
tion remained bad. Indeed, resumption for a time aggravated
the situation, because it had the effect of discrediting the
city scrip, officially called "billets desmunicipalities
and popularly, "shin plasters." Approximately $1,000,000
of this scrip had been issued, and up to the time of the ban^s
resumption had circulated at par, in preference to the depre-
52
ci8ted bank notes. Most of the "shin plasters" were held
by the poorer classes, and the depreciation of these notes
resulted in the people*s staging a riot that very nearly
wrecked the financial district.
July 16, 1842, only four banks were paying specie, the
30
Section 2:5.
31
Rightor, Henry- History of Louisiana, p. 598,
32
„
~
”Shin plasters were in great demand because they were
in small denominations. This attraction was grest enough to
pfevent the working of the "law” that cheap money drives the
more valuable money out of circulation.
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Union, the Mechanics and Traders*, the Bank of Louisiana, 8nd
the Gas Bank. These banks, however, h8d but few notes in cir-
culation. Money conditions were still deplorable, and nearly
33
all bank notes were at a discount of from 20 to 40 per cent.
Some notion of the currency situation can be formed from the
following incident related in Niles
*
Register:
"A note drawn in the name of the Gas Bank of New Or-
leans, and signed by its then president Thomas Barrett in
favor of the of the United States, payable to Mr,
Jaudon and now overdue, was sold at auction the 29th in-
stant at the St. Louis Exchange by the sheriff of the dis-
trict court. Its amount was $650,000. It was set up at
$50., and the bidding went on till it was finally knocked
down for $7070." 34
December 29, 1842, a month after the banks had resumed
specie payment, New Orleans was still suffering from an inade-
quacy of sound currency. By January 3, 1843, eight banks—-
the Bank of Louisiana, the Gss, the Mechanics and Traders*,
the City, the Commercial, the Louisiana State, the Carrollton,
and the Canal Bank, had resumed payment; the Citizens*, the
Consolidated, the Improvement, the Exchange, the bank of Or-
leans, and the Atchafalaya Bank were still suspended, and the
notes of these banks were at a discount of from 15 to 75 per
35
cent. Said Governor Mouton of the situation: "Never have
our banks been in a stronger position, and yet, owing to the
33
Niles Register, July 16, 1842, Vol. 62, p. 320.
34
Ibid.
35
The Daily Picayune, January 3,1843.
total want of the first element of prosperity—confidence—-
never has our community suffered so grievously from pecuniary
embarrb s sment." 3 6
In 1845 the enemies of the banks again took matters into
their own hands by engrafting upon the constitution of thst
year a provision that forbade the creation, renewal, or exten-
sion of any corporate body with banking or discounting privi-
-37
leges.
The very opposite of the effect desired by the enemies of
the banks resulted from this provision of the constitution.
A banking monopoly was created, and the monopoly "became more
38
and more consolidated with the lapse of time." Moreover,
since the amount of their capital was fixed by their original
charters, the banks whose charters still had some time to run
were unable to absorb the amount of capital taken away by the
expiration of the charters of the other banks. Capitsi de-
-39
creased from $20,929,000 in 1843 to $12,201,000 in 1852.
40
Interest rates rose to 8 and 10 per cent. In 1350 only
41
five commercial banks were doing business in the whole state.
56
Message of Governor Mouton, Janaary 28, 1843.
37
Article 122.
3 8
"Speech of James Robb, Esq.," De Bow*s Review, Vol. XI,
July, 1851, p. 78.
of the U. S. Comptroller of Currency, 1876, p.113.
"Banking Capital in New Orleans," Bankers 1 Magazine, Vol.
VII, Dec. 1852, p. 468.
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Commerce suffered greatly under this system. Strong as
they were, the banks were too restricted by the constitution
of 1845 to afford adequate banking facilities to business.
The Commercial Bulletin eloquently summarized the situations
"And what is the consequence of this miserably re-
strictive system? We are daily losing a trade which
naturally belongs to us, which is making others rich at
our cost, and which is exhausting our resources, and
cramping our energies. Our country friends send their
produce to us, but they do not buy of us. This last sum-
mer, New York, Boston, and other Northern cities were
filled with Southern country merchants, buying goods in
Northern markets, because they could be accommodated
with the credit they required, and which they could not
obtain in New Orleans.... Thd evil has been felt to an
injurious degree; not merely policy and expediency, but
absolute necessity demands a change.... The effete, cor-
rupt, and corrupting banking system of past days is to be
shunned and avoided, as we would a shoal or rock upon
which we had once stranded. Let us have all the required
checks, limits, and restraints to prevent abuse and the
perversion of a blessing into a curse--but a safe, con-
servative, popular banking system is what New Orleans.re-
quires as 8n essential auxilliary to her prosperity."
4^
In 1853 a new constitution was adopted to make possible
the creation of a banking system Uhst would supply the needs
of the state. Under this constitution bank corporations could
be created by special acts or formed under general laws. In
both cases the legislature was to provide for the registry of
all currency and to "require ample security for the redemption
43
of the same in specie."
Under this constitution the state wss not to "subscribe
11
1 '"42
"Banking Capital in New Orleans," Bankers
1
Magazine,
Vol. 11, December, 1852, p. 469.
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Article 118.
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for the stock of, nor make a loan to, nor pledge its faith
for the benefit of any corporation or joint stock company,
44
created or established for banking purposes.” In no case
could the legislature sanction in any way the suspension of
45
specie payment on the psrt of a bank. Bill holders of in-
46
solvent banks were given priority claims over all other debts.
In January, 1853, the first legislature under the consti-
tution of 1852 passed the free banking law. Under this law
any one or more persons were permitted
w to transact the bus-
iness of banking in the State,” and to establish offices of
47
discount, deposit, and circulation. Five or more persons
could incorporate a bank, the capital of which was to be at
least $lOO,OOO, and the charter of which was to run for a
48
period not exceeding twenty years.
The banks were authorized to "hold, receive, purchase end
convey all or any property, real and personal, as may be indis-
pensable to the objects of the association.... They shall not
hBve the privilege of holding any real estate longer thsn five
years, except such as is necessary for the transaction of their
44
Article 108.
45
Article 119.
46
Article 120
#
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Section 275*
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49
business."
All bank stock was to be paid in full in specie within
twelve months of the subscription, and no loan was to be made
by any bank on a pledge of its own stock.
w
Shares in the
bank were to be deemed personal property and transferable.
No stockholder was to be held liable for his bank's debts
51
"for a greater sum than the amount of his shares."
The auditor of public accounts was to "cause to be engraved
and printed" circulating notes of different denominations, not
52 -*
less than five dollars each#" The auditor was to distribute
to the banks circulating notes in blank equal in amount to the
bonds of the United States, of the state of Louisians, or of
the consolidated debt of the city of New Orleans deposited with
53
him by the banks. These stocks were to be always equivalent
to a six per cent stock and were to be receivable at not more
54
thBn their par value.
In addition to the security against note issues, every bank
49
Seotion 277.
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Section 281#
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Section 282#
52
Section 285#
53
Section 286# It should be noted that here Louisiana
changed the principle of her note issues, adopting the cur-
rency principle for the free banks already in use by Massa-
chusetts and the Indiana State Bank#
54
Ibid.
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or banker who did business under this act was required to have
on hand at all times, in specie, an amount equal to one-third
of 811 liabilities, and two-thirds in specie funds, bills of
55
exchange, or paper maturing within ninety days.
"Every banker and banking company out of the city of Now
Orleans doing business under this set” was required to keep
an office or designate an agent for the redemption of the
circulation at New Orlea ns
The board of currency was to supervise the execution of
57
the act. It was empowered to examine the banks at any time
it deemed necessary and to require from the banks weekly state-
ments
In 1855 this law was rewritten with no change except in
phraseology; and with the passage of this law what is commonly
called the Louisiana Banking System, was complete. No funda-
mental change was made in the system until the passage of the
National Banking Act of 1863, and the only change of any im-
portance was that made in 1861 by the act forbidding banks to
issue currency in excess of three-fourths of their capital.
The Louisiana system has been universally Bdmired. It has
also been copied, in particular by Massachusetts and the fed-
eral government. Both imitations were, in the main, the result
55
Section 300.
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303.
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of the labors of one man, Mr. Samuel Hooper, a Boston mer-
chant. After he was elected to the legislature at Massachus-
etts, Mr. Hooper devoted all his energies to the passage of a
specie reserve requirement similar to that of Louisiana. He
advocated a reserve of 20 per cent but wrB forced to content
himself with a requirement of 15 per cent*
By 1860 Mr. Hooper had become convinced, sfter observing
the operation of the Massachusetts lawj that even the 20 per
cent requirement he had formerly recommended was not large
enough; and in support of his belief he published a pamphlet
on currency and specie In which he highly praised the Louisi-
ana system and attributed its success to its large specie
reserve requirement. In 1862 Mr. Hooper was a member of Con-
gress and introduced a bill thBt became the foundation of the
national banking system.
"It is this bill with which any study of the national
banking system has to do, for although the lsw which was
passed the next February after this was known as the
Sherman agt, it was in fact the Hooper bill with a few
changes
The Louisiana system hss been widely praised and generally
copied; it has been little criticized. Later writers have,
almost without exception, regarded the composite of the laws
of 1842, 1853, and 1855 as the Ark of the Covenant; and for
a genuine criticism we are forced to rely on the judgments
59
D8vis, A . M.: The Originbf the National banking Sys-
tem, p. 56: Nations! Monetary Commission.
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of the contemporaries of the system. Of these critics the
best were John Amory Lowell, who in 1860 wrote a pamphlet
in reply to that of Mr. Samuel Hooper, and the anonymous re-
viewer of these two pamphlets in the Bankers* Magazine of
May, 1860.
Mr. Hooper based his statement that increased specie re-
serves increased accommodations and was not expensive upon
the following principles. If, he says, the banks of one com-
munity increase their loans without restrictions business
for a time becomes prosperous and prices rise. This rise of
prices increases importations, which in turn bring about ex-
portation of specie. A balance of imports and exports is
finally brought about, but the banks are weakened in their
ability to make loans because of the small amount of specie
which forms the base of these notes. On the other hand if
the banks of a community require a high specie reserve,
prices will, for a time, be lowered, and exports will be en-
couraged. This lowering in price and increase in exports
bring increased specie, and therefore increese the loaning
power of the banks. The community’s exports and imports
will again be equal, but this time a larger amount of spe-
cie will be on hand to form the bsse of an increase of loans.
Because of this specie the banks will be much stronger, and
confidence much greeter.
101
Mr* Hooper said experience had taught that, in this coun-
try, we could not depend upon agreements between banks. Only
the strong srm of the state, as in Louisiana, could compel the
banks to follow 8 course which would bring about large deposits
of specie with safety and confidence. It was to this princi-
ple alone thst he attributed the large amount of specie In the
New Orleans banks which enabled them to withstand the panic
of 1857 and keep their community in a prosperous condition.
Since Mr. Hooper had said that specie could be augmented
only by diminishing loans, his argument resolved itself, as
the reviewer in the Bankers 1 Magazine pointed out, into the
following "puzzling syllogism:
"A contraction of loans increases specie.
An increase of specie produces an expansion of loans.
contraction of loans produces an expan-
sion or loans'V" 60
Continuing the discussion, the reviewer accounts for the large
dividends and large loans of the New Orleans banks by showing
that these were due to the concentration of capital from the
South and West and from abroad; the large cash deposits conse-
quent upon the concentration of wealth in a few hands under a
slave economy; the generally profitable character of business
in such a locality, favoring rapid accumulation; and "the
agency of cotton, the only local commodity--not itself money—-
60
"Banks, Currency, and the Usury Laws," Bankers
1
Maga-
zine, Vol. XI, May, 1860, p. 834.
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which finds a universal market, and attracts capital from
all parts of the civilized world.” Moreover, "besides the
gratuitous use of foreign capital, they (~ the New Orleans
Banks 7 possess in the management of exchanges, called for
by the peculiar nature of the trade of that locality, a
source of enonnous profits"; so that it is not surprising
that they divide 10 or 12 per cent, on their very limited
62
capital, but rather that their dividends are so moderate."
Summarizing, we can say that the success of the Louisi-
ana Banking System was not so much the reward of virtue,
however great, 8S it was the natural result of the working
of the general economy peculiar to the state. Of this econ-
omy the banks were certainly a great part, but they did not
affect it so much as they were affected by it.
61
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Chapter VII
The War and Its Aftermath (1860-1882)
In 1860 New Orleans was one of the most prosperous cities
in America, in that year, when the value of her commerce
was $>128,801,128,* she reached the summit of her prosperity.
This prosperity was reflected in the condition of her banks,
which critics ere agreed were the safest and soundest in
the country, one writer going so far as to say that they
were "overflowing with gold." March 18, 1861, the New Or-
leans banks held $17,636,356 in specie and $22,751,000 in
deposits, and their circulation amounted to $8,175,000.
2
As long as they could, the New Orleans banks held out
against the pressure of public sentiment urging them to ac-
cept Confederate notes as evidence of their sympathy with
the Southern cause. On September 16, 1861, however, they
yielded. Some of the banks did not suspend immediately,
but shortly after, in obedience to a proclamation by the
governor,
3 they all ceased to pay out specie. Specie was
hoarded; and the Confederate notes, together with the scrip
the city issued at this time, soon depreciated Bnd drove
internal Commerce of U. S., p. 377: Treasury Dept.
2
Tlines Picayune, March 18, 1861.
3”Bank Items,” Bankers
1
Magazine, Vol. XVI, Nov., 1861,
p. 393. This step was necessary, said the governor, in order
to maintain the credit of the 1100,000,000 of Treasury notes
issued by the Confederate government to supply the means for
carrying on the war.
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the bank notes of the New Orleans banks out of circulation.
Whether they liked it or not, the banks continued to
support the Southern cause. They contributed a large amount
to the defense fund of New Orleans and later sent some $4,-
000,000 in specie into the Confederacy, to prevent its fall-
ing into theenemy*s hands,
4
which the Confederate government
simply confiscated and used to carry on the war. Later,
however, General But let* permitted the banks to transact bus-
iness upon the bssis of the absent coin, "just as though it
_
5
was in their own vaults."
May 1, 1862, General Butler took possession of New Or-
leans. On the same day he issued his first proclamation
to the city. This proclamation contained the following
order:
"The circulation of Confederate bonds, evidences of
debt (except notes in the similitude of bank-notes) is-
sued by the Confederate States, or scrip, or any trade
in the same, is forbidden. It has been represented to
the commanding general by the civil authorities that
these Confederate notes, in the form of bank notes, in
a great measure, are the only substitutes for money which
the people have been sllowed to have, and that greet dis-
tress would ensue among the poorer classes if the circu-
lation of such notes should be suppressed. Such circu-
lation, therefore, will be permitted so long as any one
will be Inconsiderate enough to receive them, until far-
ther orders.
4
Rightor, Henry: History of New Orleans, p. 600.
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May 16 he ordered that the circulation of Confederate
money and New Orleans scrip cease after May 27.
May 18 the banks all published notices similar to the
following one issued by the Union Bank:
"Union Bank
New Orleans, La*, May 17, 1862
"Notice.—All persons having deposits or Confederate
notes in this bank are notified to withdraw them prior
to the 27th inst. Such balances oa may not be withdrawn
will be considered at the risk of the owners. 7
"George A. Preret, cashier."
May 19 General Butler issued his famous "General Order
Q
No. 30." Out of compassion for the "great distress, pri-
vation, suffering, hunger and even starvation that had been
brought upon the people of New Orleans and vicinage by the
course taken by the banks and dealers in currency," wrote
the general, he felt "obliged to take measures to provide,
as far as may be, for the relief of the citizens, so that
the loss may fall, in part, at least, on those who have
caused and ought to bear it." He therefore
w Ordered: I. That the several incorporated hanks
pay out no more Confederate notes to their depositors
or creditors, but thst all deposits be paid in the bills
of the banks, united States treasury notes, gold or sil-
ver.
"11. That all private bankers, receiving deposits,
pay out to their depositors only the current bills of
city banks, or united States treasury notes, gold or sil-
ver.” 9
Psrton, JBmes; General Butler in New Orleans, p. 417.
War of the Rebellion, Official Records, Series IV,
Vol. TTt>— 43TT
9
lbid.
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June 6 General Butler issued Order No. 40:
"New Orleans, June 6, 1862.
"Any person who has In his possession, or subject to
his control, any property of any kind or description what-
ever, of the so-cBlled Confederate States, or who has se-
creted or concealed, or aided in the concealment of such
property, who shall not, within three days from the pub-
lication of this order, give full information of the same,
in writing, at the headquarters of the military comman-
dant, in the Custom-House, to the assistant military com-
mandant, Godfrey Weitzel, shall be liable to imprisonnent
and to have his property confiscated.”
10
July 11, the Citizens* Bank, in obedience to this order,
informed the general "that there was to the credit of the
treasurer of the Confederate States in this bank the sum of
$219,090.94; and also on special account the farther sum of
$12,465,” and that, holding a larger amount in the notes of
the Confederate treasury, it was setting aside "the equival-
ent amount in said treasury notes to offset the above stated
amount." The bank also mentioned the deposits of the "Conf.
States District Court" and the deposits of various "Confed-
erate States Receivers." All these deposits, said the bank,
hBd been "made in the currency of the Confederate government
by its appointed officers." The last item mentioned by the
bank was the assets of the #ank of Kentucky, which hsd been
held by the Citizens* Bank at the time they were sequestrated
by the Confederate government.
The deposits, said the Citizens
4 Bank, had been msde in
10
Ibid., p. 428.
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the currency of the Confederate government by its appointed
officers. The bank therefore appealed to "General Butler's
sense of equity and justice to allow these deposits to be paid
to whom it may concern in the same currency in which they were
received." The sequestrated assets of the Kentucky Bank it
11
asked to be allowed to refund to the owners.
In reply General Butler refused to recognize "any of the
sequestrations of the supposed Confederate States" and di-
rected that the accounts with the *>ank of Kentucky be made up
and all its property paid over and delivered "as if suoh at-
tempted confiscation had never been msde." All the items
but that to the credit of the Confederate States were to be
paid to his order "for the United States, in gold, silver,
or United States treasury notes at once." The item of $219,-
090.94 to the credit of the Confederate States he would re-
fer to his home government for adjudication; and "in the
meantime the bank must hold, as a special deposit, the amount
of Confederate treasury notes above mentioned, and a like
12
amount of bullion to await the decision.
All scrip was to be redeemed in the same way. The re-
sulting problem of supplying the need for small currency the
general solved by ordering
11
Ibid., p. 428.
12
Ibid., p. 430.
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"IV. That the savings banks pay to their depositors
or creditors only gold, silver, or united States treasury
notes, current bills of city banks, or their own bills,
to an amount not exceeding one-third of their deposits
and of denomination not less than one dollar, which they
are authorized to issue and for the redemption of which
their assets shall be held liable.
"The incorporated banks are authorized to issue bills
of a less denomination than five dollars, but not less
than one dollar, anything in their charters to the con-
trary notwithstanding, and are authorized to receive Con-
federate notes for any of their bills until the 27th day
of May inst."l3
To the Bank of Louisiana’s request that he examine the
bank and see for himself that it was unable to meet his de-
mands, the general replied that not having anything to do
with the "mismanagement, or the contrary of the bank," he
could not accede. He gave the directors of the bank six
hours in which to inform him whether they Intended to act in
accordance with his order "upon their corporate and individual
14
peril." Replied the bank to General Butler:
ln 1859 the” Report of the Joint Committee of
the Louisiana Legislature on banks and banking ’’recommended
the "prohibition, by all lawful means, of the circulation of
bank notes under twenty dollars," ("Bank Statistics," Bank-
ers
1
Magazine, Vol. VIII, April, 1859, pp. 808-809.) TETs
recommendation was made out of a desire to protect the work-
ing man in time of panic from having to sacrifice his wages
to note speculators. Most laborers did not receive as much
as twenty dollars a week, and, having to live "from hand to
mouth," seldom had in their possession more than their wages
for a week. If the minimum denomination of bank notes was
made $20., they could seldom have any money other than specie
in their possession and would not be compelled during a panic
to discount their money to "lynx-eyed speculators."
14
Parton, James: General Butler in New Orleans, p. 422.
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”... The board of directors were immediately sum-
moned to a special meeting; and as you leave no alter-
native but compliance with your mandate, they will con-
form to Order No. 30.”
15
The sum of $245,760 in Confederate funds was given up
by the bank. This amount General Butler sent to Mr. Chase
”to make a fund upon which those whose property has been
confiscated may have claim.” The item of $219,090.94 hsd
not been decided by the time General Butler left the de-
-16
partment.
June 17 General Butler sent to Secretary Chase a draft
on the Bank of Louisiana for 3000 pounds, which he said had
been deposited in that bank after having been collected by
17
the courts, and therefore belonged to the United States.
In August General Butler Imposed upon the banks an assess-
ment equal to the amount they had invested in the peace bonds
issued by the city of New Orleans. The fine was made payable
in four equal installments, Bnd the general used the money
to feed the large number of negroes who had taken refuge in
New Orleans, and who remained there for the duration of the
wBr.
lS
After two years of this sort of treatment from General
15
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Butler and General £sanks, the Louisiana banking system was
in bad condition. Weakened by the loss of the $4,000,000 of
specie that had been confiscated by the Confederate govern-
ment, by the losses consequent upon the payment of their own
notes and of specie to depositors of Confederate currency, by
forced gifts, and by the complete stagnation of business, the
system was in 1863 but a shadow of what it had been before
the Union occupation of New Orleans. By February 25, 1863,
the date of the passage of the National bank Act, seven of
New Orleans* thirteen banks had closed their doors.^
By the end of the Civil War the commerce of New Orleans
had decreased to the vanishing point. Measured in dollars,
the decrease was alarming enough; measured in volume, it was
incredible. In 1862 the receipts st the New Orleans port were
the smallest since Louisiana had been purchased from France.
Trade increased only slightly during the next three years;
and in 1865 what business there was, was conducted almost
entirely by foreigners, most of the New Orleans merchants
having left the city. Moreover, in 1865 New Orleans was not
even self supporting, and the military authorities were com-
pelled to feed a large part of the population.
19
General Banks succeeded General Butler Nov. 9, 1862.
20
House Document 3704, Vol. 76. For national banks be-
fore 1882, see pp. 114-115.
Banks continued to share in this loss, and in 1865 their
condition was only slightly better than in 1863. This con-
dition was reflected in the stock market. September 1, 1865,
bank stocks were quoted as follows?* (Par value, $100.)
Louisiana Bank 15
Mechanics and Traders* Bank 29
Canal Dank ($5O. par) 42
Union Bank 19
Citizens
*
Bank 76
Bank of New Orleans 16
Southern Bank 63
Merchants 1 Bank 8
Crescent City Bank 19
Bank of America 67
First National Bank 99
Inevitably people lost confidence in the banks; and it
was generally believed in 1865 that the legislature of 1866
would compel the liquidation of the weak banks. Anticipat-
ing this, the banks endeavored to improve their condition by
reducing their capital. After this reduction the capitaliza-
-22
tion of the banks of New Orleans amounted to $7,671,700.
This action proved very effective, snd aided by the be-
ginning of a recovery in business tte banks were able to im-
prove their condition considerably during the following year.
23
September 1, 1866, bank stocks were quoted as follows: (Par
2 *"The Mona? Market of N, 0. and the Southwest,” Bankers 1
Magazine, Vol. XXI, Nov., 1866,p. 375.
gg
House Document 3704, Vol. 76. In 1861 there had been
12 banks with a combined capital of $24,634,000.
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Magazine, Vol. XXI, Nov., 1866, p. 375.
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value, $100.)
Louisiana State **ank 28
Mechanics and Traders' Bank 59
Canal Bank ($5O. par) 58
Union Bank 53
Citizens* Bank 156
Bank of New Orleans 40
Southern Bank 94
Merchants’ Bank 26
Crescent City Bank 42
Bank of America 137
First National Bank 125
Despite this improvement New Orleans was ill prepared
to meet the panic of 1873. When it came, New Orleans was
suffering from a serious decline in commerce, a decline thst
hBd begun in 1870 and become greater with each succeeding
year as the railroads continued to tap the trade territory
of the city. Even before the Civil War New Orleans had
experienced a decrease in her trade territory, but the in-
crease in trade from the remaining territory wss more than
enough to offset this loss. However, when in 1870 the
volume of trade from the remaining trade territory began to
decrease, New Orleans became deeply concerned. To solve
the problem, New Orleans had to have railroads—and she
could not get them. In the eyes of the railroads the river
hBd become too unnavigable for New Orleans to remain long
an important shipping point; they therefore rejected the
state*s offers of bonds, financial assistance, and public
lands.
in 1874, however, came the turning point for New Orleans.
In that year Congress provided for the improvement of river
113
transportation. Captain Eads was given a contract to try
his jetty plan. By the end of the first yesr of his experi-
ment, he had deepened the river some six feet; by 1879 he
had given the center of the channel 8 depth of 30 feet, and
the largest vessels Bfloßt could navigate the river in safety.
Deep water enabled New Orleans to reestablish her position
as an important trading center, and the railroad companies
became anxious to put down lines to the city.
Not only did railroads change the volume of trade; they
also changed the very character of business. Much of the
trade was brought to the city by rail instead of by water;
and still more was mere transit goods, not handled by the
city at all; and the city*s percentage of profit on the
goods WBS not as large as it had been before the advent of
the railroads. Moreover, most of the new business was done
through exchanges and the board of trade*
New Orleans experienced another panic in 1879* The panic
was local, but none the less severe. In 1877 the "carpet
bBg" rule of Louisiana had come to an end, and the incoming
governnent had been left with the problem of paying off the
debts created by the carpet baggers snd funded by them in
the consols of 1874. In 1877 and in 1878 Louisiana had de-
faulted interest payment on these consols; and by 1879,
when the constitutional convention met, there was strong
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sentiment in favor of outright repudiation. Fearing that
the convention would repudiate the consols, depositors of
banks thought to own large amounts of these bonds took fright
and started runs on the banks. Starting with the Southern
Bank, the runs soon became general, and all the banks were
forced to suspend. Three banks, the Southern, the Merchants
and Mechanics 1
, and the New Orleans Savings Institution,
were liquidated; and depositors were paid from 15 to 50 per
cent on their money.
In 1864 the first national bank was organized in New
Orleans. This bank, called the First National Bank of New
Orleans, was capitalized at $500,000. From the beginning
it was successful; and at a time when the stocks of all the
other banks were quoted at below psr, Its stock continued
to be quoted at its face value. In 1866 two more national
banks, the City National and the Louisiana National, were
organized, the foraer with a capital of $300,000 and the
latter with a capital of $1,000,000.
In 1867 the heavy defalcations of its president ruined
the First National Bank; and the comptroller of the currency
ordered it closed. In the excitement caused by the closing
of this bank, runs set in on the City National and the Loui-
siana National. Both these banks were in good condition,
but the runs so seriously crippled the City National that
it was not able to resume until 1868. The large capital of
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the Louisiana National effectively protected it from serious
injury from the runs. The First National Bank never reopened.
Between 1870 aid 1872 five national banks, the New Or-
,
24
leans, the Union, the Germania, the New Orleans National
Banking Association, and the Mutual National bank, were or-
ganized. In 1872 the combined capital of these bsnks amounted
to $4,850,000; surplus, to $220,000; and undivided profits,
25
to $311,000. Their combined note circulation amounted to
#3,549,000.
26
By 1882 it was generally felt that a change was neces-
sary in the state banking system. Not only were the state
banks suffering from the competition of the national banks,
but, on account of the legal requirement of $lOO,OOO capital
for the organization of state banks, the smaller towns were
unable to get state banking accommodations. To relieve this
situation the legislature in 1882 passed a bill devised to
make possible sn increase in the number of small town banks.
It is with this law that the last period of Louisiana state
banking begins; this period will be treated in Chapter IX.
Since the state debt and the controversies over its set-
tlement had a tremendous influence on banking and politics
24
This was the reorganized Citizens* Bank.
25
Keport of the U. S. Comptroller of Currency, 1875.
26
The Federal government had taxed state notes out of
existence.
from 1874 to 1884, this problem will be considered in the
next chapter.
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Chapter VIII
The State Debt and Repudiation
By 1842 Louisiana had issued $24,450,000 of bonds on be-
half of the banks. The following table shows the amount is-
sued for each bank and the date of issue:
1824 Tha Bank of Lousiana $ 2,400,000
1828 The Consolidated Assn, of Planters 2,500,000
1832 The Union Bank 7,000,000
1833 The Merchants and Mechanics’ Bank 150,000
1835 N. 0. Gas-Light and Banking Company 150,000
1836 The Citizens' Bank 12,000,000
1836 The Citizens 1 Bank 250,000
Total 24,450,000
Of this total of $24,450,000, $1,200,000 had been re-
tired by the Bank of Lousiana, and only $7,000,000 of the
bonds issued for the Citizens
1
Bank were sold. The total
state debt incurred on behalf of banks was, therefore, in
1842, $18,250,000.
By 1848 $5,854,616.13 of the bonds issued on behslf of
the banks had been retired through liquidations of the mort-
gages put up by the various banks as a guarantee of the bonds
issued for them by the state. The remainder hBd been funded
Charters of the various banks.
No. 22, Section 19, as amended by Act. No. 90, Sec-
tion 7, Louisiana Legislature, 1842. This amount was issued
in payment of a loan made by the Citizens* Bank to the state.
Consolidated Association of Planters v. State, 5 La. Ann. 44.
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as follows:
The Union Bank $ 3,234,000
The Consolidated Assn. of Planters 1,923,775
The Citizens' Bank 7,257,608.87
Total 12,395,393.87
In 1866 the legislature extended to 1876 the date of pay-
ment of the final series of bonds issued for the Consolidated
Association of Planters.
When the legislature passed the funding act in 1874, it
created a mystery that puzzled the courts of the state for
the next fifteen years; viz., did the state repudiate its
guarantee of the bsnk bonds? To understand this question, it
is necessary to know the history of the state's disposition
of the entire indebtedness.
Prom 1365 to 1877 Louisiana was governed by the carpet -
baggers, whose rule was one of greet extravagance. Taxpayers,
groaning under a tax rste that had Increased from 37-1/2 cents
§
In 1365 to 75 cents In 1869, attempted to check this extrav-
agance by having a constitutional amendment passed limiting
the amount of the state debt to $25,000,000. In spite of this
amendment, the debt continued to increase—and with it the tax
g
rate, which in 1871 amounted to $2.15. In New Orleans a com-
mittee of property owners and taxpayers was formed to put a
iAuditor*s Report, Jan, 1, 1848, p. 16,
Magazine, 1872, Vol. 26, p. 26.
6
Tbn:""
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stop to the stated extravagance. In 1871 this committee es-
timated that the constitutional limit of $25,000,000 had been
7
exceeded by $15,000,000, and published in three languages e
circular containing figures to prove their contention. In
this circular all bankers, brokers, and prospective bond hold-
ers were warned that the tax payers would not pay taxes to
o
discharge any debt in excess of the constitutional limit*
This circular evidently had its effect, for Governor Wfir-
mouth was soon complaining that it was
M
an act of madness, in-
spired by a wily and cunning rival for the Texas trade, and
the political prejudices of the opposition were toyed with to
influence the people to sign it." It was "wrong in princi-
ple Bnd false in fact,” said the governor, and its effect was
to stop negotiations for bonds which he had on foot, and to
9
break down the credit of the state.
In 1873 Governor Warmouth gave way to another carpet bag-
ger, William P, Kellogg. The new administrations as faced
with the problem of reducing the state debt, interest on which
had been defaulted in 1873. This debt, according to the state
auditor, amounted to 124,356,338.72 snd included the following
items:
1. Bonds outstanding January 1, 1874 # 22,433,800
2. Auditor*s warrants (old) 1,565,702.08
7
Jan. 17, 1892 the New Orleans Republic quoted the state
auditor as stating that the debt amounted to more than $41,000,000.
Debts and Re Pudlatlon'"
*
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3. Auditor*s warrants (new) 225,051.22
4. Certificates of indebtedness 131,785.42
Total 24,356,338.72
In a statement attached to his report the auditor listed as
"miscellaneous debts" the sum of $4,803,083.33. "It is ob-
vious that it (~ the plan of the auditor and the legslature~)
excluded the bonds loaned to the Citizens
* Bank and to the
Consolidated Association of Planters, which amounted in round
numbers to the sum above stated, as a debt for which the state
was contingently liable.
*
The debt was scaled down 40 per cent, and the $15,000,000
of consols bearing 7 per cent interest were issued to be used
by the board of liquidation in funding the debt. Section 5
of the act levied a tax of 5-1/2 mills on all real and personal
property, the proceeds of this tax to be used to pay interest
on the consols and provide a sinking fund for their retire-
12
ment.
This act having received the sanction of a constitutional
amendment, the board of liquidation began its work of funding
the bonds. The board soon discovered, however, that many of
the bonds were of doubtful legality; and on the recommendation
of the board the governor called a special session of the leg-
islature to provide further rules for the funding of the state
*S*ope and Co. v. Board of Liquidation, 41 La. Ann. 647.
No. 6, Louisiana Legislature, 1874.
121
debt. The legislature provided that the board of liquidation
fund the questioned bonds only after their legality had been
certified to by the courts.*^
Two cases may be mentioned to show the nature of the obli-
gat ions held by the courts to be not fundable. In the State
ex rel. T, Bartlett v. Board of Liquidation,
3,4
the plaintiff,
a tax collector, asked the court’s approval as fundable of a
warrant given him by the treasurer of the state. This war-
rant, said the plaintiff, had been given him as a refund for
the amount he had paid the state in excess of the state’s share
of taxes collected. The court held that although an act passed
by the legislature in 1871 had provided a fund for the payment
of such claims as the plaintiff’s, the plaintiff’s claim in
this instance being based upon no other evidence than his own
word Bnd that of the treasurer, was "too genera 1" and was,
therefore, not fundable. In Mutua 1 Insurance Go. v. Board of
15
Liquidation the plaintiff presented for the court s approval
a bond issued by the state on the income from the assets of
the Free School Fund. The P*ee School Fund had been abolished
in 1872, Bnd its assets transferred to the "Redemption Fund of
Floating Debts." The state had issued bonds on the income
from these assets, and it was one of these bonds that the
plaintiff asked to have approved as fundable. Stating that
Vx
r:A ct No. 11, Louisians Legislature, 1875,
JSsi La, Ann. 273.15
31 la. £nn. 175.
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the transfer of the assets of the Free School Fund had been
"an act of spoliation" and contrary to both a state and na-
tional statute, the court held the bond not fundable.
The constitutional convention of 1879 reduced the interest
on the consols to 2 per cent for five years (beginning with
1880), 3 per cent for 15 years, and 4 per cent thereafter. It
also reduced the rate of the tax for debt purposes from 5-1/2
mills to 3 mills.
16
The majority of the holders of the console were unwilling
to accept the reduction in the interest. By the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, individ-
uals could not sue a state. Bond holders living in New York
and New Hampshire assigned their bonds to their states for
collection, and the attorney generals of the two ststes then
sued the state of Louisiana for the interest on these bonds.
The Supreme Court held that since the states were only acting
as agents for individuals, the Eleventh Amendment removed the
suit from the court’s jurisdiction.**7
In 1882 the legislature of Louisiana agreed to a proposal
of the bond holders thBt the state pay 2 per cent interest on
the consols for five years and 4 per cent thereafter. This
agreement was made an amendment to the constitution and ap-
proved by the people in May, 1884.
16
of 1879, Article 1.
New Hampshire v. Louisiana 108 U. S. 76:27 l. Ed. 656.
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In his report to the legislature in 1874 the auditor did
not include in his estimate of the state debt the bank bonds
v
still outstanding, which in 1874 were as follows:
Citizens* Bank $4,296,633.23
Consolidated Assn, of Planters 506,450.
Total 4,803.083,33
The bonds for the Consolidated Association of Planters
were funded in 1878. October 1, 1877, the board of liouida-
tion refused to fund the bonds issued for the Consolidated
Association of Planters on the ground that they were not a
part of the state debt as listed by the auditor in 1874. This
19
ruling was reversed by the courts. When the state took
over the Consolidated Association of Planters in 1843, said
the court, it made itself directly responsible for the bonds.
The bonds were, therefore, a legal part of the debt of the
state. Moreover, since the addition of the bank's bonds to
the funded debt of 1874 would not increase the amount of con-
sols beyond the 115,000,000 limit set by the funding act of
1874, the bonds could be funded without violating the funding
act of 1874.
In 1874 the total debt exclusive of bank bonds amounted
to $24,356,338.72. By 1914, $23,437,639.51 of certificates
of indebtedness had been presented for funding; of this amount
the courts had held $3,191,601.76 "not fundable," so that
and Binder v. Board of Liquidation, 30 La. Jm,
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$20,246,037.75 had been funded. The entire debt, with the
exception of fractional parts of certificates of indebtedness
(which were funded at par) hBd been funded on the basis of
.60 on the dollar, and $12,378,621.87 of consols had been is-
-20
sued.
By 1880 the state was $1,381,299.63 in arrears in inter-
est payments on the consols. To psy this interest the state
issued non interest-bearing ’‘baby’* bonds. By 1914, $470,570
of the "baby" bonds had been paid 0ff.
21
The state repudiated
22
the balance of $910,727.63.
By January 1, 1878, 123,437,639.51 in bonds and certifi-
cates of indebtedness had been presented to the board of li-
quidation for funding. Of this amount the board had listed
N 23
$18,799,634.46 as fundsble and $4,638,115.05 not fundable.
s?Auditor f s Report, 1914, p. 78.
21jbid
#
22TTTT913 the attorney general of New York ruled other-
wise. The New York official was called upon to settle this
question by the various savings banks of the state, which had
agreed to purchase a 1914 bond issue of the state of Louisiana.
By the laws of the state, New York banks were forbidden to
invest in the bonds of any governnent that had ever been
guilty of repudiating a bond issue; and the New York banks
asked the attorney general for a ruling on the question of
the unretired $910,729.63 of "baby" bonds issued in 1880.
The attorney general ruled that since these bonds hsd been
secured by taxes delinquent in 1878, and Louisiana hBd pledged
itself to do no more than apply these taxes as collected to
the payment of these bonds, the state had not violated any
pledge. ("Louisiana Debt," Financial Chronicle. No. 36, p.
236. )
23
Report of Board of Liquidation, Jan. 1, 1878, pp. 26-27.
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This list was later revised by the courts.
The bonds for the Citizens
1
Bank were held by Hope 8nd
Co. of Amsterdam, in 1880 this company took stock in the
Citizens* Bank to an amount equal to the defaulted interest
24
of its bonds. In 1889 Hope and Co. began its efforts to
have these bonds funded. No decision was given by the board
on the fund8bility of the bonds until 1891, when it declared
the bonds not fundable on the ground thst they were not a
part of the state debt in 1874. The court reversed this rul-
.
25
ing, holding the bonds fundable on the following grounds:
first, that the funding act of 1874 clearly provided thst all
legal obligations of the state were fundable; second, that
the bonds for the Citizens* Bank were unquestionably legal
obligations of the state; and third, that the funding of these
bonds for the Citizens* Bank would not increase the state
debt beyond the constitutional limit of f15,000,000.
The court therefore instructed the board of liquidation
to fund the bonds for the Citizens* Bank in accordance with
the funding act of 1874 and the amendment thereto; that is,
to issue consols to the amount of 60 per cent of the original
issue. The company was also awarded interest on the consols
at the rate of 7 per cent for six years, 2 per cent for five
years, and 4 per cent from 1885 to the date of funding.
24
Hope and Co. v. Board of Liquidation, 43 La. Ann. 741.
25
Ibifi.
Prom this total of interest and principal the board was
to deduct the following items:
1* Payments already made $ 2,060,466,35
2. Interest on the payments Not given.
3. Amount already paid by bank on
coupons 300,000.
4. Cash in bank’s sinking fund for
the retirement of bonds 85,000.
5. Amount of Hope and Co.’s stock
in the Citizens’ Bank 133,000.
6. Stockholders* mortgages guar-
anteeing the bonds 800,000.
Hope and Go. requested a rehearing, but the court refused,
2 6
and the bonds were never funded.
The following is a tabulation of the funding of the state
27
debt:
Amount of the state debt in 1874 $ 24,356,338.72
Amount presented for funding by 1914 23,437,639.51
Amount not fundable 3,191,601.75
Amount funded by 1914 20,246,037.75
Amount of bank bonds funded by 1914 446,102
Amount of consolidated bonds issued
by 1914 12,378,621.87
26
Hope Bnd Co* v* Board of Liquidation, 45 La. Ann. 741.
27
Report of Louisiana State Auditor, 1914, p. 78.
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Chapter IX
1882-1930
By 1882 Louisiana hsd made much progress in reconstruc-
tion. The "stormy days in Louisiana politics" had come to
an end in 1876 snd given way to comparative calm. The jet-
ties were completed, and the largest steamers afloat could
reach New Orleans in safety. Ths era of railroad building
was well under way, and by 1882 four main trunk lines to New
Orleans had been laid down.
Despite these gBins the state wss far from being well off.
Property values in 1882 were sane $90,000,000 greater than in
1876, but the state still ranked thirty-seventh in the United
States in per capita wealth.
1
The amount of business had in-
creased, but bank capital in the whole stste amounted to only
$5,158,000. Moreover, much of what progress was being made
was halted in 1882 by the great flood, the most damaging in
the history of the state.
One of the main reasons for the long duration of the de-
pression WBs the unsettled condition of the finances of the
stBte. Governor Warmouth spoke truthfully when he declared in
1872 thBt the credit of the state was ruined; and in 1882
States Census, 1880, Vol. Vil, quoted in Times-
Democrat, September 7, 1684, In 1860 Louisiana had ranked
second.
States Comptroller s Report, 1882.
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Louisiana was still suffering from what the New Orleans Times-
Democrat called a "universal distrust," which had not "merely
affected the credit and honor of the commonwealth, but ... to
a great extent, affected injuriously individual credit, pre-
vented investment of foreign capital, and excluded immigration.
By fBr the greatest impediment to growth was the inade-
quacy of commercial facilities, a situation thst was further
complicated by the problem of an insufficient snd inelastic
currency. Both of these difficulties were, for the most part,
what Henry J. Ford called the "baneful" results of the opera-
tion of the national banking system.
The system had achieved the objectives set for it by its
proponents, which were to improve and extend the market for
government bonds and to provide a safe national currency of
uniform value, 8nd to this extent it wss a success. Judged
by the criterion implied by its title, it was a dispiriting
failure: just as the Holy Roman Qnpire was neither holy nor
Roman nor imperial, the national banking system was neither
4
national nor banking nor systematic.
The first and most obvious defect in the system was the
3
Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis
Convention, p. 197.
4n
This system was not founded on banking principles, but
with the special idea of making a market for government bonds.
...
The national banking system is national only in name."
(Ford, Henry J.: "The Denationalized hanking System," The
Bankers' Magazine, Vol. LIV, January, 1897, p. 67 #
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small number of banking units. There was no provision in the
national law for the opening of national bank branches, snd
the high capital requirement for the establishment of indepen-
dent national banks 5 made it impossible for any but the larger
and more prosperous communities to secure banks of their own.
Moreover, the business of what banks there were was rig-
idly confined to local fields of operation.
"The courts have decided thst under the lsw 8 bank can-
not even arrange to hsve checks upon it cashed anywhere
else. No matter how bank funds may congest in cities or
in particular sections, there is no way by which the banks
of those sections can extend their transactions to regions
where there is a greater demand for banking facilities. A
transfer of funds from place to place goes on, but it is by
means of losns effected by banks whose local fields make such
an active demand as to furnish two banking profits for the
SBke of obtaining the supply. The effect, according to
Chairman Walker of the House currency committee, is to make
the cost of loans and discounts in the South and West fully
two per cent, above the normal rate."
6
Not only did the law make almost impossible the creation
of new banks; it also made Impossible the furnishing of ade-
quate supplies of currency. Under the system of note issues,
a bank might ”issue circulation not exceeding 90 per cent, of
the par value of the bonds deposited.” Each bank was required
to deposit with the treasury a redemption fund of 5 per cent
of its outstanding circulation; and the notes were secured by
a first lien on all the assets of the bank, including the lie-
-7
bility of the shareholders.
5550,000. The bank Act of 1864, Sec. 7.
sFord, Henry J.: clt., p. 68.
7
The national bank lsw of 1874, Sec. 32.
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This system unquestionably provided a "ssfe national
currency of uniform value"; in other respects, however, it
WBs unsatisfactory.
"1. It presupposes a continuing issue of government
bonds, when it ought to be the national policy to steadily
reduce and ultimately to extinguish the debt of the United
States.
"2. The investment in bonds diminishes the funds of
the bank available for losns to its customers.
”3. Such a currency does not increase in volume with
a temporary demand for more currency, nor decrease with
the cessation of the demand."8
In the larger cities a mechanism of exchange was afforded
by the clearing-house relations of the banks, by deposit cur-
rency; and the note-issuing functions of banks were, properly,
"supplementary to the wholesale exchanges cerried on by means
of checks snd drafts."
9
Those regions where the system of
checks and drafts was least in use, and where, as a result,
the note-issuing functions of banks were most valueble, were
almost wholly without the benefits of a machinery of exchange.
Over a large part of the South and Southwest, therefore, al-
most primitive conditions of barter prevailed. Payments were
made in kind, for there was no money. Instead of gsing to
a bank for funds, the farmer secured credit for goods st the
country store or obtained supplies from
the commission mer-
chant who handled his crops, "submitting to charges at every
of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis
Convention,p. 45.
9
»» *
"The first Step in Currency Reform, The Bankers Mage-
zine, Vol. LIV, March, 1897, p. 375*
step which out a big hole In his profits at the best of times"
and in bad times left him in debt.
The system was not changed for many years; and during
these years "the efforts of the government, sustained by
heavy taxation were exerted to diminish as much as possible
the quantity of the one asset available for note emissions,"
10
In Louisiana, as in many other states, the
n state" bank-
ing system was also a misnomer. Towns that were without
national banks were also without state banks, being deprived
of even this boon because of a state capital requirement
even larger than that of the national law,* 1 Moreover, only
one state bank, the Citizens', was permitted by Its charter
to establish branches, and this bank wss not strong enough
to extend Its operations*
In 1882 the Louisiana legislature attempted to remedy
this condition. To make possible the creation of new banks,
the legislature lowered the minimum capital requirements.
12
The following Is a statement of the new requirements:
Cities of 2,000 population #10,000
Cities of 2,000-4,000 population 15,000
Cities of 4,000-6,000 population 20,000
Cities of 6,000-10,000 population 25,000
*°Ford, Henry J. : ££. clt., p. 68.
11|100,000. Louisiana Laws, 1855, Sec. 2.
ct No. 80, Louisiana Legislature, 1882.
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Cities of 10,000-15,000 population 30,000
Cities of 15,000-25,000 population 50,000
Cities of more than 25,000 population 100,000
Despite their need of banks, communities were slow to
avail themselves of the privilege granted them by this law,
and not until 1887 were any new banks organized. This slow-
ness in the transition from the credit system built up after
the war to a credit system dependent upon banks was in large
part the slowness characteristic of any change. Unquestion-
ably, however, the flood of 1882 had a great deal to do with
the delay, and the panic of 1884 had even more. In the last
decade of the century banking progress was hampered mainly
by the unsettled condition of the currency already referred
to. By 1899, fifty-six new state banks had been organized.
In 1898 the constitutional convention created the office
of state bank examiner. By the terms of the constitution,
tho examiner was required to examine the stste banks at lead;
twice each year and to perform any other duties prescribed
14
by the legislature.
This provision of the constitution was enacted into law
in the same year. As amended in 1916, the law required the
«
bank examiner to "report biennially to the Legislature at the
13
First Report of the Louisiana Banking Department, 1899,
d. XIV. The increase in banking capital was not large, only
$3,796,000.
of 1898, Article 194.
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commencement of each session:
"lst. Such information in respect to banking associa-
tions and savings banks as in his judgment may be useful....
"2nd. A statement of the banks, banking associations,
and savings banks whose business has been closed during
the two preceding years:
"3rd. Such report shall be made and printed at least
twenty days before the day of each meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly and a copy thereof shall be immediately trans-
mitted to the governor, auditor, and treasurer of the
state."^s
Another amendment authorized the bank examiner, with the con-
sent of the governor, to close Bny bank whose continued opera-
-16
tion he deemed "unsafe, inexpedient, or hazardous."
Act No. 45 of the legislature of 1902 established a re-
serve requirement for state banks. As amended by Act no. 91
of 1918, the lew required that a cash reserve of 20 per cent
against demand deposits be kept, 4 per cent of this reserve
to be in cash on hand, and the remaining amount to be depos-
ited in reserve banks.
"For the remainder of its liabilities for demand de-
posits there shall be kept on hand an amount equal there-
to in lawful money of the United States or cash due from
other banks or bills of exchange or discounted paper matur-
ing not more than one year, or bonds, stocks, or securities
of the United Ststes or any of the states, or of the mu-
nicipalities of corporations, public or private, thereof,
or of the levee boards of the state of Louisiana, provided
that the deposits made in the savings banks, or in the
savings department of a bank doing general banking busi-
ness, which are made on the condition that they may not
be withdrawn except on notice, shsll not be considered
demand deposits within the meaning of this section.”
17
No. 198, Louisiana Legislature, 1898, as amended
by Act No. 187, 1916.
16
Act No. 300, Section 1, Louisiana Legislature, 1910.
No. 45, Section 5, Louisiana Legislature, 1902,
amended by Act No. 91, 1918.
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If the reserve of any bank falls below the required amount
and remains so for ten days, the bank is not permitted to
18
make further loans until the reserve has been replaced.
Bank loans on real estate may not exceed 65 per cent of
the value of the real estate, except in the case of savings
banks and savings departments, which may lend up to 85 per
19
cent of the value of the real estate. No officer can lend
the funds of his bank "to any corporation, the subscribed
capital of which has not been paid up to the extent of fif-
ty per cent, of which he may be an officer or in which he
may be a stockholder, without adequate security to be approved
by the board of directors."
v
No bank is permitted to lend
to one person more than 20 per cent of the capital and sur-
plus of the bank.
In 1916 the minimum capital requirement was raised; at
the same time it was required that 50 per cent of the capital
stock be paid in before the bank opened for business and the
remainder within 90 days. The minimum was again raised in
22
1924. The following are the capital requirements set by
the law of 1924:
Towns of less than 3,000 population $25,000
No. 179, Section 15, Louisiana Legislature, 1902*
,
as amended by Act NcQ.B4, 1916,
oiAct No. 145, Section 1, Louisiana Legislature, 1910.
~£Act No. 184, Section 28, Louisiana Legislature, 1910*
22Act No. 90, Louisiana Legislature, 1924.
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Towns of 3,000-30,000 population 50,000
Towns of more than 30,000 population 100,000
Banks already organized on the basis of the former capi-
tal requirements were not required to raise their capitaliza-
tion.^^
Every State bank is required to ”set aside annually 8t
least one-tenth of its annual net profits for the establish-
ment of a surplus fund, until such time as the surplus fund
shall be equal to at least twenty 120) per cent of its entire
paid-up capital stock.... The whole or any part of such sur-
plus fund may be converted 8t any time into paid-up capital
stock, but in that event such surplus fund shall be restored
in the manner above provided for until it shall amount to at
least twenty per cent of the aggregate paid-up capital
stock."**4
In 1928 the Louisiana Legislature attempted to do away
25
with the "loan shark” by passing a small loans law. Loan
companies were required by this law to obtain a license from
the state and to submit to supervision by the state banking
department. The maximum loan was fixed at $3OO, and 3-1/2
per cent per month
was msde the maximum interest charge. By
1931, 92 small loan companies were in operation in Louisiana;
23
Act No. 90, Louisiana Legislature, 1924, Section 2.
24^ct No. 193, Section 2, Louisiana Legislature, 1910.
25
Act No 7, Louisiana Legislature, 1928.
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in this year these companies made total loans of $6,966,559,-
26
91.
In 1902 the legislature passed a law to regulate the build-
ing and loan or homestead associations. As amended in 1920,
this law permitted any number of persons, not less than five,
who were residents of the state, to
w
organize a corporation
for the purpose of assisting the members thereof in purchas-
ing, building, improving and repairing real estate and home-
steads, and removing encumbrances therefrom, and for the pur-
pose of loaning money to the members thereofThe lsw
places few restrictions on building and loan associations,
and the state banking department has repeatedly complained
of this fact. The department hsd this to say in its report
for the year 1928-29:
"This department has on many occasions stressed the
need for greater restrictions for these institutions, and
greater authority for the supervising officer ... all that
your supervising officer can do is to beg, plead, and per-
suade until such practices endanger the safety of the in-
stitution. Then all that is left for him to do is to re-
port the delinquent institution to the Attorney General
for such action as he deems advisable.... It is neither
right nor proper thst the supervising officer be held
responsible for a given task unless he can be given proper
tools with which to work." 2B
Prom 1920 to 1930 the number of building and loan associations
increased from 64 to 101, and the amount of capital from
of the State Bank Commissioner, 1930-31, p. xiv.
7
Act No. 120, Section 1, Louisiana Legislature, 1902, as
amended by Act 122 of 1920.
Report of the State Bank Commissioner, 1928-
29, pp. vi-viii.
137
CQ
*34,000,000 to *189,000,000.
The law of 1924 required thst all capital be paid in be-
fore the bank began operation. Banks established under a law
previous to that of 1924 were permitted to continue operation
under their original charter#
In 1930 there were only two strictly savings banks in Lou-
isiana. There were 11 trust and savings banks and 70 bank and
30
trust companies.
Banks doing business in Louisiana are taxed upon their
capital stock at the same rate as other personal property
31
under the laws of the state.
’’The shares of stock and the real estate of banks, bank-
ing companies, firms, associations, or corporations, doing
a banking business in this State, chartered by the laws of
this state or of the United States, .are hereby declared
subject to taxation fa all purposes in the State of Louisi-
ana .
"The shares are assessed at actual value or the same
percentage of actual value as that fixed on other property
for State and local assessment purposes ... to the share-
holders at the domicile or location of the bank ... regard-
less of the domicile of the shareholder and regardless of
any transfer not registered or entered upon its books.
All taxes so assessed against the shares of stock must be
paid by the bank, and the banks are required to
collect the
33
amount thus paid from the shareholders or their transferees.
29
Eighteenth Report of the State Bank Commissioner, 1928-
29, pp. vii.
30
Report of the State Commissioner, 1930-31.
Statutes, 307.
32
Act No. 14, Louisiana Legislature, 1917, as amended by
Act No# 116, Section 1, 1922.
3^lbid.
,
Section 2.
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The banking house and all real estate are "assessed di-
rectly to the bank." The actual value is "determined upon
by the Board of State Affairs for State assessment purposes,
and the local taxing authorities for locsl purposes, without
regard to the value of said property as shown on the state-
ments of such banks, banking companies, firms, associations
or corporations, but which shall be equal and uniform with
all other classes of property.* 3 *
All state banks in Louisiana are required to pay both a
stBte and a loesl tax* The local tax may not exceed the tBx
fixed by the state* The stste banks are divided into 21 classes
on the basis of their capital stock, and the amount of the
license tax varies from $5O for banks of a capital of $25,-
000 or less to $5,500 for banks capitalized st $5,000,000
35
or more.
All state banks doing business In Louisiana must submit
to examinations by the state bank department. Moreover, "no
person, firm, association, company or corporation, either do-
mestic or foreign, excepting only banks organized under the
laws of the United States ... which has not received from the
Examiner of State °anks a certificate of authority to do a
banking business” may engage in the business of banking in
34
acAct No. 31, Louisiana Legislature, Sec. 1, 1914.3m, Act 235, Sec. 4.
’ ’ *
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Louisiana or use the word "°ank," "Banking," "Savings t*ank,"
"Savings," "Trust," "Trustee," "Trust Company," or any other
tg
word of a similar import as a part of its name or title.''
Stockholders of stste banks in Louisiana sre liable to
37
the full amount of their stock subscriptions.
Such, in brief, Bre the laws under which the Louisiana
state banks operate.
At the close of the year 1899, the first year in which
state banks were required to submit to state examination,
there were in Louisiana 57 state banks, with total resources
38
of $20,713,761.03, and 20 national banks, with resources
39
of $34,000,000. The following tables show the growth in
number and totsl resources of both state and national banks
from 1899 to 1930. For the sake of comparison, figures for
the South Bnd the United States are also given.
36
Act 137, Louisiana Legislature, 1918.
Statutes, Sec. 282.
SSReport of the State Bank Examiner, 1900, p. 10.
of the United States Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 1912, p. 307.
NUMBER OP BANKS AND TOTAL RESOURCES
40
(Resources Given in Thousands)
4°These figures were compiled from various reports of the
State Banking Department of Louisiana and from reports of the
U. S. Comptroller of the Currency.
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National Banks
1898
State Banks
No.
Per cent
of total Amount
number
Per cent
of total
amount
No.
Per cent
, of total Amount
number
Per cait
of total
amount
L8
#
19 25 34,400 62 57 75 20,713 38
So. 537 39 387,900 62 919 61 228,451 38
u.s* 3598 47 4,944,100 73 3965 53 1,759,835 27
1909
I»8
.
35 15 99,300 46 187 85 120,195 54
So. 1403 39 993,696 55 2163 61 607,750 45
u.s. 6887 32 9,363,196 77 1134 68 3,338,669 23
National Banks State Banks
1920
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
No, of total Amount of total No. of total Amount of tot8l
number amount number amount
La. 36 14 154,845 32 229 86 364,653 68
So. 1639 23 3,107,248 50 5445 77 3,137,471 50
U.S. 8019 26 23,135,784 43 22,109 74 29,667,855 57
1930
La. 31 13 130,807 34 191 87 446,061 76
So. 1154 22 3,512,970 55 3950 78 2,873,110 45
U.S. 7197 34 29,116,539 65 13,582 66 15,269,902 35
Per Cent of Increase in the Number and
Resources of National and State Banks
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1898--1930
Per cent of in-
crease in no.
Per cent
increase
of Per cent
in amt. increase
of
in no.
Per cent in-
crease in amt.
La. 63 252 235
—
1065
So. 115 1390 330 1300
u.s. 100 556 242 913
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There are a number of assignable reasons for this differ-
ence in the percentage of increase in the amount of resources
and in the number of the state and national banks in Louisiana.
Nearly all the reasons can be summed up under the general ex-
planation that the Louisiana system has not been so strictly reg-
ulated as the national system. The small capital requirements
of the Louisiana law made possible the organization of a lsrge
number of banks that could never have secured sufficient eapi-
tal to organize under the national Isw; and the single liabil-
ity imposed upon stockholders by the state law was less fright-
ening to bank investors than the double liability required
by the national system. The stste laws with regard to the
operation of banks were also more attractive to prospective
bankers. State restrictions on loans were much less restric-
tive than the national laws. A large part of the loans of
state banks were on real estate, and stste banks were permit-
ted to hold for ten years any resl estate that they hsd se-
-41
cured through non-payment of mortgages. Personal loans
were more stringently regulated in the national system, being
limited to 10 per cent of the capital and surplus of the banks.
Twenty per cent of the capital and surplus of stste banks might
be put into personal loans; and if adequate security was fur-
nished by the borrower, the whole amount of the capitsl and
41
Act No. 140, Louisiana Legislature, 1906.
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surplus oould be loaned.
Still another reason for the larger growth of the state
system was the opportunity that the state banks had to estab-
lish branches. By 1927, the year in which national banks
were first authorized to establish branches, there were 92
43
branch banks in the state of Louisiana.
Since 1920 there has been throughout the country a move-
ment toward centralization in banking. This centralization
has been brought about partially through failures and through
44
consolidations and mergers: from 1920 to 1930 there were 43
45 a.*
failures, 10 consolidations, and 27 mergers.
° It has also
been achieved through group or chain and through
42
Act No. 179, Louisiana Legislature, 1902, as amended
by Ac|j NO. 8, 1922.
Report of the State Banking Department, 1927-28, p. lxiv.
44
"A consolidation occurs where an entirely new bank is
organized to take over two or more existing institutions,
whereas a merger is effected when one of the banks already
existing absorbs another institution, the latter giving up
its charter and losing its identity as an independent unit."
(CBrtinhour, G. T.: Branch, Group and Chain Banking, p. 257.)
45
Report of U. S. Comptroller of Currency, 1930, p. 664.
46
Reports of the Louisiana State Banking Department,
1920-1930.
47
As defined by the Federal Reserve Board, chain or group
banking is "control exercised principally through stock owner-
ship, or by a holding company, or in some instances by a bank,
either directly or indirectly through a subsidiary company."
(Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1928, p. 30.)
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branch banking.^®
In 1930, 10 banks were members of groups or chains. In
spite of this fact, however, chain or group banking in Loui-
siana is of questionable legality.
"There ere no laws in Louisiana directly applicable
to bBnk holding corporations. While one subdivision of
the 1928 Acts
... permits corporations to acquire, and
to hold, shares of any other corporation, domestic or for-
eign, it seems uncertain if this subdivision permits group
corporations to own shares in view of certain other restric-
tive subdivisions.”49
The principle of branch banking has not been given a tho-
rough trial in Louisiana. It seems clear thst if the princi-
ple of state branch banking is sound, banks should not be
limited in establishing branches to any political subdivision
of the state. Too often it happens that the trade area of a
banking center does not coincide with the area of the county
or parish in which the bank is located, and in a restricted
system a bank is often unable to supply banking facilities to
its natural trade territory.
Up to 1930 only one bank operating branches
had failed.
Five branches, two of which were in New Orleans, hBd been with-
drawn. All the withdrawals were caused by insufficient bus-
-50
iness.
48wBranch banking maj be considered to exist when a par-
ent bank opens city, county, or state-wide branches, all func-
tioning under one head office, with a common capitalization
available for all branches, with identical stockholders and a
single charter.
w (Cartinhour, G. T.: Branch, Group, and Chain
Banking, p. 277.)
p. 212.
Report of the State Banking Department, 1929, p. xlviii.
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The following table shows the number of branches, both
state and national; the total number of banking offices
(branches plus banks); and the per cent of the banking of-
fices th8t were branches in 1930 in the twelve states with
branch bank laws similar to those of Louisiana. ®1
The following table shows the number of branches in the
51
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Dec., 1930, p. 815.
State
Number of
branches
Total no.
of bank
offices
Per cent the
branches were
of the total
Georgia 42 432 9
Kentucky 31 580 5
Louisiana 108 330 32
Maine 66 197 33
Massachusetts 168 617 27
Michigan 434 1165 38
Mississippi 25 318 7
New Jersey 106 666 15
New York 750 1872 40
Ohio 264 1250 21
Pennsylvania 194 1735 11
Tennessee 69 548 12
Total 2,257 9,710 14
146
home office, the number of branches outside the home office,
and the per cent of branches outside the home office in 1930
in the twelve states with branch banking laws similar to tho®
of Louisiana.
Number of Branches
State In home
office
Outside of
home office
Total Per cent of
branches out-
side home of-
fice
Georgia 19 23 43 54
Kentucky 28 3 31 9
Louisiana 51 57 108 55
Maine 7 59 66 8
Mass. 148 20 168 11
Michigan 434 0 434 0
Miss* 1 24 25 96
New Jersey 96 10 106 9
New York 750 0 750 0
Ohio 232 32 264 12
Penn. 185 9 254 3
Tenn. 31 38 69 55
Total 1,982 275 2,257 12
APPENDIX I
LOANS AND DISCOUNTS, SPECIE, CAPITAL STOCK, CIRCULATION
AND DEPOSITS OP LOUISIANA BANKS PROM 1805 TO 1863
(000 omitted)
figures are taken from House Document 3704, V01*76.
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Year
Number
of Banks
Capital
Stock
Loans 8nd
Discounts Specie Circulation Deposits
1805 1 500
1810 1 500
1820 4 2,592
1830 4 5,605
1335 41 26,422 37,388 2,824 5,114 7,106
1836 45 34,065 51,236 2,607 7,130 11,744
1837 47 36,769 59,108 3,108 7,909 11,487
1838 47 39,943 55,593 2,729 7,558 7,426
1839 46 40,930 56,593 3,987 6,290 7',657
1840 47 41,726 49,138 2,347 4,345 5,415
1841 47 41,711 48,646 3,153 6,443 3,094
1843 28 20,926 20,420 4,451 1,167 5',338
1844 28 20,049 16,737 7,889 1,721 6,473
1845 28 19,670 18,017 8,282 2,099 8,418
1846 28 17,538 21,582 6,636 4,206 9,449
1847 28 17,090 23,869 5,720 4,753 7^983
1848 28 15,575 21,497 5,578 3^709 8^654
1849 28 15,236 19,173 8,153 4,165 8,427
1850 28 14,257 18,602 6,979 5,069 8,210
1851 29 12,370 23,199 5,750 5,090 8,275
1852 29 12,205 22,407 4,355 3,514 6,948
1853 29 10,934 17,034 5,946 4,409 10,555
1854 19 17,359 29,320 7,468 6,969 11,743
1855 19 20,179 27,142 6,570 6,586 11,688
1856 19 19,027 27,500 8,191 7,222 14,747
1857 19 21,730 31,200 6,811 9,194 13,478
1858 15 22,800 23,229 10,370 4,366 11,638
1859 12 24,215 29,424 16,218 9,094 21,322
1860 13 24,096 25,001 12,115 11,579 19,777
1861 13 24,634 26,364 13,656 6,881 17,056
1863 6 17,388 16,225 8,806 8,876 5,810
APPENDIX III
THE NUMBER, CAPITAL STOCK, AND LOANS AND DISCOUNTS OP
LOUISIANA STATE BANKS, 1864 - 1897
(000 omitted for 811 items except the number
of batiks)
These figures Bre from House Document 3704, Vol. 76.
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Year
No. of
Banks
Capital
Stock
Loans and
Discounts
Deposits
1864 10 22,248
1865 10 7,671
1866 7 9,271
1867 7 9,271
1868 11 10,014
1869 11 8,270
1870 12 7,801
1871 12 7,055
1872 9 5,717
1875 5 3,729 4,441 6,149
1876 6 3,584 5,195 6,300
1878 10 4,353 7,048 6,082
1879 10 4,428 6,428 6,393
1880 10 4,458 6,108 7,086
1881 10 4,458 6,108 7,036
1882 4 2,213 6,411 6,407
1883 4 2,213 6,411 6,407
1884 4 2,563 6,849 6,732
1885 4 2,582 4,036 5,816
1887 5 2,017 5,289 5,660
1888 6 2,117 3,823 5,819
1889 6 2,130 5,675 5,899
1890 6 2,130 6,235 7,486
1891 11 2,620 7,528 7,519
1892 16 2,820 7,644 8^515
1893 18 2,755 8,451 8,338
1894 22 2,840 8,031 8,543
1895 27 2,882 7,591 8,228
1896 20 2,517 6,825 7,128
1897 20 2,413 5,845 5,942
APPENDIX III
TABLE SHOWING SEVERAL ITEMS FOR NATIONAL BANKS IN
LOUISIANA FROM 1864 TO 1898
(000 omitted except for number of banks)
Document 3704, Vol. 76, and report of the U. S.
Comptroller of the Currency, 1898.
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Year
Number of Capital Undivided Total
Banks Stock Surplus Profits Resources
1864
1865
1
1
500
500 17
76
183
2,210
5,089
1866 3 1,800 35 340 3,637
1867 2 1,300 59 119 684
1368 2 1,300 62 105 1,128
1869 2 1,300 70 93 i;483
1870 2 1,300 107 102 1,446
1871 7 3,500 145 247 4,670
1872 9 4,850 220 311 6,425
1878 9 4,750 297 300 7,512
1874 7 3,850 277 358 4,901
1875 7 3,650 483 353 5,673
1876 7 3,300 539 284 5,922
1877 7 3,300 516 269 5^237
1878 7 2,615 573 340 4,839
1879 7 2,875 448 299 5',297
1880 7 2,875 570 320 6,013
1881 7 2,875 815 336 6,487
1882 8 8,945 965 392 8*053
1882 8 3,225 1,102 414 8', 136
1884 9 3,625 1,102 555 7,122
1885 9 3,025 1,306 506 8,994
1886 9 3,525 1,154 452 10,402
1887 13 3,425 1,229 595 11,912
1888 13 3,425 1,508 395 12i880
1889 15 8,685 1,658 370 14,784
1890 19 4,325 1,901 771 14,359
1891 21 4,435 2,091 735 18^328
1892 21 4,435 2,148 775 13,549
1893 20 3,935 2,496 673 15,513
1894 19 3,760 2,612 543 18,039
1895 19 3,660 2,740 452 10,081
1896 18 2,860 2,608 488 15,301
1897 19 3,160 2,679 519 16;503
1898 19 3,160 3,736 622 18,395
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APPENDIX IV
PRINCIPAL ITEMS OP RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OP
STATE BANKS IN LOUISIANA PROM 1899 TO 1930
(000 omitted except in number of banks)
1
These figures were tsken from the reports of the Stste
Banking Department of Louisiana from 1899 to 1930.
Year
No. of Loans and Capital Undivided Total
Banks Discounts Stock Surplus Profits Resources
1899 56 12,666 3,796 514 916 22,208
1900 61 14,524 4,907 550 1,059 22',694
1901 66 4,214 928 55,622
1902 92 4,635 966 1,198 64,887
1903 102 37,312 8,275 4,259 58,648
1904 131 43,597 8,635 4,605 1,479 71,359
1905 144 53,995 10,998 5,611 1,605 89,259
1906 165 61,302 14,089 6,815 1,993 99'495
1907
1908
178
185
63,902
51,875
14,777
14,066
7,493
7,444
2,221 102^413
97,949
1909 187 63,762 13,231 108^914
1910
1911
206
208
27,787
74,624
13,677
13,851
7,544
6,938
2,541
1,304
119',512
127,159
1912 216 78,849 14,123 6,739 3,005 127,740
1913 217 76,327 14,938 7,052 2,305 124^500
1914 214 72,464 14,779 7,528 2,341 126^109
1915 210 88,830 14,720 7,543 2,752 131,103
1916 209 87,350 14,079 7,600 2,769 159,976
1917 210 112,190 14,721 8,031 2,181 230,824
1918 211 140,610 16,053 8,961 2,228 260,490
1919 221 211,110 18,991 9,981 3,328 380,502
1920 237 251,109 21,356 11,601 3,517 377;929
1921 231 213,406 23,044 12,052 3,538 332,242
1922 230 218,429 23,227 12,092 3,583 364,863
1923 227 240,605 22,776 12,825 3,882 402,807
1924 216 248,070 23,060 13,469 4,048 411,295
1925 214 270,179 24,045 14,098 4,292 447,062
1926 201 264,599 24,280 14,693 5,409 433,676
1927 200 253,847 24,361 15,026 4,544 442,168
1928 195 252,098 24,097 15,680 5,225 452,654
1929 191 256,590 24,563 16,141 5,620 446,061
1930 183 220,280 24,180 14,944 5,931 393,576
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